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This study addresses the question of whether there is an equil~brium between the 
Colombian government and the guerrilla groups. This subject is addressed for the purpose 
of gaining an understanding and finding answers to Colombia's violent political conflict. 
The study argues that there is an equilibrium between the government and the 
guerrilla groups. The author uses three variables, the military balance, the peasant support 
for the guerrillas, and the weakness of the state, to discuss the equilibrium and its effect in 
this conflict. 
In conclusion, the author maintains that the equilibrium between the actors in the 
conflict is not structural, but is a circumstance of the effects of both the narco-trafficking 
and the failure of the judicial system. If this balance is to change, action must be taken on 
two fronts, narco-trafficking and the judicial system. 
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This study demonstrates that there is an equilibrium in the violent political conflict 
in Colombia. This study deals with several questions, among the most important are the 
following: 
• Why hasn't the equilibrium between the Colombian government and the 
guerrilla groups been broken or changed by events such as the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and communism? 
• Does the equilibrium work to the advantage of either side (or both sides)? 
• Has the government a solid national policy or solid strategy to deal with the 
guerrilla groups? 
• Is the government following the right political program to undermine the 
peasants' support for the guerrillas? 
• What has been the effect of narco-trafficking on the growth of the guerrilla 
groups? 
• What are the conditions for the process of the consolidation of democracy in 
Colombia to unfold? 
The importance of this topic bears directly on the current situation in Colombia. The 
present conflict in Colombia is characterized by two factors: political corruption and the 
effect of narco-trafficking on society. These factors do not allow the government to create 
an effective solution to this complex violent political struggle. In other words, these factors 
will not allow the government to create a policy that leads to a change in the balance 
among the actors in the struggle. 
Colombia's guerrilla conflict is unique in Latin America because narco-trafficking is 
an ingredient of the unstable political situation. This contributes to a weak state. This factor 
is not present in some other Latin American guerrilla conflicts, including Cuba and 
Guatemala. However, this phenomenon of guerrillas and narco-trafficking has appeared in 
El Salvador, Peru and even Nicaragua, but not on the scale as in the Colombian case. It 
xvu 
appears clear that the guerrilla groups have been able to increase their power because the 
narco-trafficking has increased the groups' fmancial resources. 
Chapter II will analyze the strength and the military capacity ofthe guerrilla groups 
in terms of organization, strategy, fmances, location, political and military objectives, and 
external aid. This will be compared with the military power of the government in terms of 
informal pressures, organization and strategic distribution, internal resources, U.S. 
assistance, operational results, and the role of the Armed Forces as a political actor in this 
conflict. 
Chapter III will analyze peasant support for the guerrillas. Before beginning the 
explanation of this variable it is very important to present the concepts of Timothy 
Wickham-Crowley. Wickham-Crowley holds that: 
The three measures of degree of peasant support are: How many peasants 
are willing to commit resources to the guerrilla cause? What kind of 
resources are these persons willing to commit to the guerrillas? Under what 
range of circumstances will they commit that resource?1 
This study analyzes the peasant support for the guerrilla groups, in terms of open 
political support, Regional legacies, local influence issues, the narco-guerrilla's concept and 
the cocalero support (or peasant self-interest). Additional dimensions are addressed: the 
levels of peasant support, the process of resources committed, and the different methods of 
guerrilla recruitment. 
Chapter IV addresses the weakness of the state and the emergence of dual power in 
Colombia. This is another important variable in the theory established by Timothy 
Wickham-Crowley. This theory concerns the success or failure of guerrilla revolutionary 
movements in Latin America. Military strength and peasant support are not enough to 
ensure a successful revolution. A situation of multiple sovereignty or dual power must also 
exist. The passive members of a society must transfer their consent from the incumbent to 
the new governments. Wickham-Crowley attempts to describe this particular variable in 
Timothy Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton 
University Press 1992), p. 52. 
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terms of the role of the middle and upper classes, political parties, and the mass media. This 
chapter answers the question: is there a situation of dual power in Colombia? 
Chapter IV analyzes the state's ability to confront the guerrilla threat. Wickham-
Crowley asserts that regime weakness has allowed revolutionary movements to succeed, 
particularly when guerrillas confront neo-patrimonial states. This chapter discusses certain 
weaknesses of the Colombian state and the failure to consolidate a viable democracy, with a 
view to determining whether the guerrillas weight in future prevail this issue is explored in 
full in the concluding chapter. 
In summary, the equilibrium between the actors in the conflict is not structural; it is 
a circumstance of the effect of narco-trafficking on the society and the failure of the judicial 
system of the state. The dangerous trend was demonstrated by the eradication protest where 
the peasants' economic interest were supported by the guerrillas and the narco-traffickers 
and opposed by the government, driven in part by international pressure. This trend is 




A. IMPORTANCE AND DESCRIPTION OF THE THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the current violent political conflict in 
Colombia. The author will use Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley's theory concerning 
successes or failures of guerrillas and revolution in Latin America. This thesis will argue 
that an equilibrium has been established in recent years between the guerrillas and the 
Government. Unless there are conditions that alter this equilibrium in some ways, there can 
be no solution to this conflict. 
The guerrilla groups are strong enough to hold their positions, but not strong enough 
to topple the government. Even though the government is strong enough to hold the country 
together and stay in power, it is not militarily strong enough to wipe out or even reduce in a 
substantial way the guerrilla movements. Thus, there is a typical equilibrium between the 
actors. 
The most important questions that this study addresses are: 
• Why hasn't the equilibrium between the Colombian government and the 
guerrilla groups been broken or changed by events such as the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and communism? 
• Does the equilibrium work to the advantage of either side (or both sides)? 
• Has the government a solid national policy or solid strategy to deal with the 
guerrilla groups? 
• Is the government following the right political program to undermine the 
peasants' support for the guerrillas. 
• What has been the effect of narco-trafficking on the growth of the guerrilla 
groups? 
• What are the conditions for the process of the consolidation of democracy in 
Colombia to unfold? 
1 
The importance of this topic bears directly on the current situation in Colombia. The 
present conflict in Colombia is characterized by two factors: political corruption and the 
effect of narco-trafficking on Colombian society. These factors ·do not allow the 
government to create an effective solution to this complex violent political conflict struggle. 
In other words, these factors will not allow the government to create a policy that leads to 
change in the balance among the actors in the struggle. 
Colombia's guerrilla conflict is unique in Latin America because narco-trafficking is 
an ingredient of the unstable political situation. This factor contributes to a weak state. This 
factor is not present in some other Latin American guerrillas conflicts, including Cuba and 
Guatemala. However, this phenomena of guerrillas and narco-trafficking has appeared in El 
Salvador, Peru, and even Nicaragua, but not in the scale of the Colombian example. It 
appears clear that the guerrilla groups have been able to increase their power because the 
narco-trafficking has increased the group's financial resources. 
The guerrilla groups today are better able to produce chaos and disorder than at any 
previous time. A social revolution is unlikely but the outcome may well be an unstable 
society for many years. The political instability of Colombia will be a major obstacle to the 
development of a fair society and a stronger democracy. 
B. LIMITATIONOFTIDSSTUDY 
1. . The data available is not good enough for an exact analysis of guerrilla 
financing for two reasons. The first is that this kind of activity is secret and 
unlikely to leave a record. Managers who cooperate with the government 
normally disappear or do not want to be identified with the possession of the 
information. Second, the information is not gathered in a systematic way 
because it is dangerous to gather in any case. 
2. An analysis of the development of the guerrilla groups is difficult because not 
all the information is publicly available outside those groups. Without the 
system of information used by the armed forces it would be difficult to achieve 
any analysis of the actors in this conflict in Colombia. Normally information is 
only gained when the armed forces capture people and materials. 
2 
3. Colombia's conflict has its own unique problems and origins. However, some 
of the main issues addressed in this study are similar to other Latin American 
conflicts. By utilizing the comparative approach this study hopes to propose 
medium and long term solutions for Colombia. 
4. Published analysis of the Colombian political conflict has moved back and forth 
during the last four decades, but this author will not seek to explain all the 
details of the political history in Colombia or balance the varying views of the 
conflict. 
C. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The theory of Timothy Wickham-Crowley addressing the successes or failures of 
guerrillas and revolution in Latin America is based on three variables. The approach of this 
study is to analyze these variables for the case of Colombia to see whether there is an 
equilibrium between the government and the guerrilla groups, and then to draw some 
conclusions and formulate recommendations. Each of the variables in the Wickham-
Crowley study will be covered in individual chapters. 
In the late twentieth century, guerrilla warfare can be characterized: 
The true innovations of guerrilla warfare are the transfer of this tactic to 
internal wars, rather than in external wars against foreign occupiers or 
colonial powers .. .In most cases of modem guerrilla warfare, including all 
those discussed in this work, the insurgency is, or i.lltends to become, a civil 
war in which the populace will eventually [be forced to?] side either with the 
guerrilla forces or with the government in power.2 
Wickham-Crowley begins his argument with the theoretical debate over the causes of 
revolutions using the material of well respected scholars, including Eric Wolf, Jeffery 
Paige, Charles Tilly, and Theda Skocpol. 
Skocpol's argument is that internal structural weakness of these overthrown regimes 
plus international pressures led to their collapse. The primary problem with Skocpol's 
2 Wickham-Crowley, p. 4. 
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interpretation is not in her reading of the three cases she uses, but whether these examples 
enable one to generalize to the case of Latin American countries. 
This author will examine three possible causes of revolution as presented by 
Timothy Wickham-Crowley as a series of questions: 
What are the social political conditions underlying peasant support for 
revolutionaries in the countryside? What elements contribute to militarily 
strong guerrilla movements or government armed forces? We must also 
inquire into the historical origins of those weak political regimes in Cuba 
and Nicaragua, and further discuss why those regimes were likely to elicit a 
cross-class opposition from civil society, leading eventually to the creation 
of dual power and an incipient counter-state. 3 
The crucial and theoretical linkage here is between a peculiarly weak "old regime" 
and that regime's tendency to press the elements of the opposition toward an alliance, rather 
than to the better strategy of aggravating the opposition's internal divisions and conflicts. 
Wickham-Crowley maintains that when these three features converge in a society, 
the likely outcome is a social revolution. This study will present each one of the questions 
above as a variable to adapt the theory to the current situation in Colombia. This will be 
done in the following way: 
The first variable will be the strength and military capacity of the guerrilla groups in 
terms of organization, strategy, financing system, location, political and military objectives. 
This will be compared with the military power of the government in terms of internal 
resources, US assistance, informal pressure, organization and strategic distribution, training, 
systems and the role of the Armed Forces as a political actor in this conflict. 
The second variable, is the peasant support for the guerrilla groups, in terms of open 
political support. The study will use data from the most recent national elections ( 1988-
1990-1994). This study will also describe regional legacies of political violence, 
3 Ibid., p. 9 
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dimensions of degree of peasant support, the narco-guerrilla and the "cocalero"4 support, 
methods of recruitment, sources of support, and the process of resources committed. 
The third variable is the weakness of the state and the emergence of dual power. 
Wickham-Crowley attempts to describe this particular variable in terms of the role of the 
middle and upper classes, of the political parties, and the media. The question is whether 
there is a weak state and the emergence of dual power in Colombia. 
D. A BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE GUERRILLA 
MOVEMENTS IN COLOMBIA 
This section addresses the origin of the two guerrilla groups, the F ARC-EP and the 
ELN-UC. In this thesis these groups will be denoted as F ARC and ELN. It is very 
important to understand why and when these groups appear in the violent political 
movement in Colombia. 
1. FARC 
This group was formed in the second meeting of the Southern Block, by the leaders 
ofthe different groups on July 20 1964. The group consists of the former nuclei of militants 
from the regions calle~ "independent republics" such as Marquetalia, Rio Chiquito, and 
Sumapaz, in the Departments ofTolima and Cundinamarca. The initial members came from 
peasant origin, many with bandit backgrounds and from the Liberals-Conservative 
guerrillas. There were also members from urban cadre from the Colombian Communist 
Party, (PCC). This peasant origin is a common factor in almost all F ARC members' 
backgrounds, especially the top and mid level of the organization leadership since 1960s. 
An important stage in the life of this group was the peace negotiations in the middle 
of the 1980s with the Betancourt government. At the beginning of President Betancourt 
term the Congress approved Law 35, November 19, 1982 that gave total amnesty to the 
guerrilla groups at that time. Later the congress approved the law 45 of 1985 to create the 
legal framework for the peace process with the guerrilla groups. This law was especially 
4 The "Cocalero" refers to the peasant who grow and produce cocaine in the south of Colombia. 
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targeted at the F ARC group because it was the largest and oldest movement. As a result of 
this process the UP (Patriotic Union) appeared as a political party and gained political 
options and other political power as a third party. When the peace process broke down the 
F ARC doubled its number of people and arms from 1,800 combatants, and 15 fronts, to 
4,000 combatants and 32 fronts. From this result an analysis of this group could conclude 
that its support of the peace negotiations was weak and the real purpose was to reorganize 
their forces. 
Another important stage in the life of the F ARC was the creation of a large 
organization to regroup all the guerrillas in one entity. After the peace negotiation with the 
Betancourt government the "Cordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar"\ (National Guerrilla 
Organization), CGSM appeared. However, each one of these groups has its own 
organization and does not believe that there is a real utility and efficiency in a central 
political and military command. After a military operation called "Operaci6n Colombia" by 
the Armed Forces in December 1991 against the leaders of these groups in a place known as 
"Casaverde,''6 the leaders had to be dispersed especially in the central and south part of 
Colombia. Casaverde was the central command of these guerrilla groups for almost 20 
years. The leadership of this group has been changed recently with the death of Jacobo 
Arenas in 1990. Jacobo Arenas was one ofthe most important ideologists and part of this 
organization for many years. Although the peasant Manuel Marulanda a.k.a. Sure Shot 
"TiroFijo" is alive, he was part of the liberal guerrillas. Liberal guerrillas were part of the 
independent republic of Rio Chiquito (south Tolima). Marulanda has led this organization 
from late 1968 until now. He is close to the age of 70 and has health problems. Therefore, 
both leadership positions are open for new guerrillas leaders. The political-ideological 
5 This organization was created in 1986. In the beginning it created many expectations among the guerrilla 
groups, because it was another tool to pressure in case of a negotiations or to get support of the guerrilla 
groups. 
6 Casaverde (Green House), was the simile of a government palace in case of the triumph of the revolution. It 
was located in the piedmont of the eastern plains between La Uribe and Medellin del Ariary, as well as in the 
middle courses of the Ariary, Guape, and Guejar rivers. The F ARC members know that, for example the 
symbol of the Government in Argentina is the "Casa Rosada," or in United States, the White House. 
6 
leader is a former law student, Guillermo Leon Saenz a.k.a Alfonso Cano. The military 
leader is Jorge Briceno Suarez, a.k.a Mono Jojoy. Suarez is the typical example of the 
hardened combatant. He is the guerrilla leader who has taken the strongest military actions 
against the armed forces in the last ten years. 
The increase of resources in personnel and material had been slow in the early years 
of the organization, but recently this group has been growing in both resources and 
personneL Recently the group has gained influence in some regions and towns. Also 
according to Bruce Bagley, " The F ARC, is the oldest and longest standing guerrilla 
organization in all of Latin America."7 Recently it has become the wealthiest due to the 
narco-trafficking income. 
To explain the reasons for the appearance of this guerrilla group in the earlier 1960s 
in Colombia it is necessary to understand various processes at that time, among them are the 
following: 
• The problematic judicial situation of the former people of the "independent 
republics." 
• The hatred between liberals and conservatives and the influence of the 
communist ideology. 
• The agrarian problem in Colombia. 
• The failure of the peace negotiations after the Rojas government (1958). 
• The movement of former liberal guerrillas to colonize other areas of Colombia. 
These guerrillas had fled from the violence between 1950 and the late 1960s. 
• The weak process of consolidation of the democracy with the National Front 
and the Sitges and Benidorm pact among the elite of the traditional parties on 20 
July 1956. 
• The Cuban revolution and its effect on the thinking of all the peasants and 
politics of Colombia. 
7 Bruce Bagley, William Walker III, Drug Trafficking in the Americas (Coral Gables Florida, University of 
Miami 1994), p. 96. 
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2 ELN 
In July 4, 1964 this group was created by former Colombian scholarship students in 
Cuba. The initial organizational and ideological bases came from the Worker-Student-
Peasant Movement (MOEC). Its leadership has been composed mainly of students and 
graduates from the Industrial University of Santander. 
According to Eduardo Pizarro: 
The Brigade Pro National Liberation Jose A Galan was created in 
Havana ... On January 7, 1965, the ELN opened fire on the town of 
Simacota, Santander, and distributed the "Manifiesto of Simacota", to attract 
national public attention8 
The ELN has strong ties with Cuba and with "the Cuban road to socialism." The 
organization gained international notoriety in 1966 when the well educated Roman Catholic 
priest, Camilo Torres R., died in a confrontation with a patrol of the regular Army. This 
group was nearly destroyed by the National Army after the "Anori" operation in mid 1973. 
The ELN's leaders, Fabio Vasquez Castafio and his brothers, were killed or captured by the 
Armed Forces. This was the low point of this organization's history. In 1980 the former 
Spanish priest Manuel Perez a.k.a Plutarco and a peasant, Nicolas Rodriguez, a.k.a Gabino, 
became the leaders of this guerrilla group. 
This group operates from their territory in the north part of Colombia, mainly in 
south Santander and northern of Antioquia. The group's defining characteristic is the 
struggle against petroleum exploitation and the profit made on natural resources by 
Colombian economic institutions and foreign investors. The ELN is the most radical of the 
guerrilla groups in Colombia. During the First National Military Conference and the 14th 
National Plenum, in July, 1995, the ELN changed some ofthe important aspects oftheir 
tactical and strategic plans by launching the National Tactic Plan 1996-1998. 
8 Eduardo Pizarro, "Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia," in Violence In Colombia, eds. Charles 
Bergquist, Ricardo Pefiaranda, and Gonzalo Sanchez (Wilmington, Delaware, A Scholarly Resources Inc., 
1992), p. 177. 
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This group is the typical example of the effect of the Cuban revolution in Colombia. 
They began the construction of a revolutionary movement in the same way as Castro. All 
the ideology, strategy and tactics come from the ideal revolution, an exported product of 
Cuba in the sixties. 
3. Guerrilla Development 1978-1995 
As part of the historical background of the guerrilla groups this section will address 
their development in numbers of members. The following table presents the evolution and 
growth of the guerrilla groups during the last four presidential periods.9 These data were by 
the Colombian Governments from 1978 until1995: 
Table 1. Guerrilla Development 1978-1995 
Group 1978-1982 1982-1986 1986-1990 1990-1994 
Administration J.C. Turbay B. Betancourt V. Barco C. Gaviria 
FARC 1,200 1,800 1,800 4,000 4,000 5,800 5,800 6,800 
% 50% 233% 383% 466% 
ELN 190 230 230 1,800 1,800 2,600 2,600 3,150 
% 21% 847% 1268% 1557% 
Why was the growth of the guemlla groups so great m that penod after 1982? 
The first factor is the peace process of the Betancourt administration in 1982-1986. 
In that period the FARC groups grow 233%, the ELN 847%. Before the peace process the 
ELN was almost destroyed and his leaders jailed. This indicates that the guerrilla groups 
had not a real intention of making peace with the government. Later the peace process 
failed, because the government did not ask for a real commitment to the process from the 
guerrillas. 
The second factor that explains the growth of the guerrilla groups is the financing 
system of both the F ARC and the ELN. This political violent conflict began 40 years ago 
among Colombian political parties. The Cuban revolution of the early sixties led to the 
creation of communist guerrilla groups. In the early 1980s the guerrilla leaders became 
aware of a necessity of acquiring other sources of financing. This crisis for most of the 
9 Jesus La Rotta, Las Finanzas de Ia Subversion Colombiana (Santa fe de Bogota, Ediciones los Ultimos 
Patriotas, 1996), p. 61. 
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Colombian groups pushed their leaders to enter the initial marriage with the narco-
traffickers for financing, in return for security and protection of the traffickers. The groups 
assumed that the narco-trafficking would be a powerful engine for their revolution and 
therefore began an increase in the growth of the guerrilla groups. In the words of Che 
Guevara and Regis Debray, from their theory ofFoquismo: 
The guerrilla foco should create the conditions to revolution and that 
revolution the engine to impulse itself. 10 
One of the most important assumptions is that the narco-trafficking has been the 
driving engine and the impulse of the guerrilla groups in the late 1980s. This issue of narco-
trafficking is one of the factors that has led to a strategic equilibrium in the Colombia 
political violent conflict. 
In the F ARC case the period beginning in 1982 was also its marriage with the 
narco-traffickers and is the initial stage of the process. The F ARC provided services to the 
traffickers, especially in protection. For example, security of areas of growing and 
laboratories, loading and unloading of small airplanes, and control of domestic runways in 
the south part of the country were services provided by F ARC. Later in 1988-1990 
according to Mayor Luis A. Villamarin: 
The FARC had been developing interest for the cocaine areas. In 1991 
from 48 rural fronts 27 are in areas of coca production. Regularly this 
guerrilla group has influence in areas of process of cocaine or close to the 
laboratories of chemical processing.11 
In the ELN case, in the period beginning in 1982 it began to extort the oil 
companies especially the foreign ones. One of the biggest successes of this group was the 
famous case of Manessman, a German-multinational oil company headed in United States 
that paid US$5 million dollars to the ELN for the liberation of two engineers. Later this 
10 Ibid., p. 29. 
11 Luis A. Villamarin P., El Cartel de Las FARC (Santa fe de Bogota, Ediciones El Faraon, 1996), p. 85. 
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form of financing expanded to include all companies, both national and foreign connected 
with the oil business in Colombia. 
The third factor that strengthened the guerrilla groups was the increased use of 
political violence and the appearance of violence by _right wing groups in response to the 
guerrillas. According to Eduardo Pizarro: 
This relative strengthening of the guerrilla movement does not mean in 
the least that it has historical viability. On the one hand, the guerrilla 
advance has been accompanied by an unexpected development of 
paramilitary groups all over the country, which threaten to plunge the 
country into a generalized "dirty war". Here is a partial list: Muerte a Los 
Secuestradores (Death to kidnappers), El Escuadron de la Muerte (The 
Death Squad), Muerte a Abigeos (Death to Rustlers), Alfa 83, Pro Limpieza 
del Valle del Magdalena (Clean-up of the Magdalena Valley), Los Tiznados 
(the Soot Faced), Movimiento Anti-Comunista Colombiano (Colombian 
anti-Communist Movement), Los Grilles (the Crickets), El Escuadron 
Machete (The Machete Squadron).12 
E. SUMMARY 
This brief historical background of the guerrilla groups and their initial links with 
the narco-traffickers shows that this study of the equilibrium in Colombia conflict is based 
on the actions of the three actors in the conflict. It is argued that narco-trafficking is the 
largest contributor to both the creation of a weak state and the increasing resources of the 
guerrilla groups. This section presented the three variables of this thesis and the historical 
origin of both guerrilla groups. The F ARC was created from the colonization process of 
peasant "Independent Republics' and the ELN came from the universities under the 
patronage of Cuba. 
In the guerrilla developments of the last 16 years, the F ARC group increased its 
members by 466%, the ELN group by 1557%. This phenomenon has three explanations, the 
peace process of the Betancourt government beginning in 1982, the linkage between the 
narco-traffickers and the guerrillas in the 1980s-1990s, and the right wing paramilitary 
12 Pizarro, "Revolutionary Guerrilla Groups in Colombia," pp. 189-190. 
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groups' use of violence, which plunged the country into a "dirty war." The following 
chapters will present a detailed explanation of these three factors and make the argument 
that the Colombian conflict is in an equilibrium of the balanced forces -of a weak state, the 
narco-traffickers and the guerrilla groups. 
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II. THE EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN FORCES 
The first variable to be addressed is the strength and military capacity of the 
guerrilla groups in terms of organization, strategy, financing, location, activities, 
international aid, and the groups' political and military objectives. The data will be 
compared with the military power of the government in terms of informal pressures, 
organization and strategic distribution, internal resources, operations, US assistance, and the 
role of the Armed Forces as a political actor in this conflict. 
Some authors have called this equilibrium a "negative tie"13 between the armed 
forces and the guerrilla groups. On the other hand, in the words of Raymond Aron, the 
Colombian conflict is: 
... an impossible war and at the same time an unlikely peace.14 
The following sections will show the characteristic of the most important actors in 
this conflict, the armed forces and the guerrilla groups of the F ARC and ELN. Other 
guerrilla groups, for example the dissident group of the former M-19, and the dissident 
group of the former EPL, do not represent a real threat to the Colombian government. 
However these groups may at some future point constitute a factor of disorder and chaos. 
These small dissident guerrilla groups were part of the fragmenting process of the guerrilla 
movement in the 1980s. 
A. GUERRILLA MILITARY STRENGTH: 
The following section on the guerrilla military strength will show: 
• The general strategy that these groups have been developing in the last years 
• The political and military objectives 
• Their organization and strategic location 
13 Eduardo Pizarro, Jnsurgencia sin Revolucion (Santa Fe de Bogota, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1996), p. 231. 
14 Ibid., p. 247. 
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• . The sources of fmancing, and especially how they use narco-trafficking as the 
fundamental source for financing a revolution 
• How they develop their activities to gain local influence in some part of the 
territory 
• Their international influence 
1. General Strategy 
One of the most important characteristics of both the FARC and ELN, is their 
general strategy. These strategic goals are the outcome of almost 40 years of armed struggle 
and the effects of various stages in that long process. At the present time a concrete strategy 
is to consolidate their local influence. In real terms this means a dual power at the regional 
and the municipal level. We will see that they have achieved some control, but this control 
is limited. Both groups propose a change in the Colombian political system without 
considering the issues of the failure of the Communist system and the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union. They both pursue a Socialist path for the development for Colombia. 
However, both groups are at the point of no return, because having spent many years in that 
cause, they have only achieved a military equilibrium. They require a stronger position to 
force negotiations like those in El Salvador and Guatemala. 
The likelihood of peace through some sort of negotiation is not entirely clear. Often 
the groups have used this tactic to regroup and build strength before starting a new round of 
violence and disorder in Colombia. Examples are abundant in the last 14 years of different 
peace talks with the Colombian government. Nevertheless, the F ARC has proposed the 
creation of a clandestine political party called the "Bolivarian Movement for a new 
· Colombia on the 28th, May 1996."15 This party's purpose is to create political conditions 
favorable to F ARC in the future. 
15 "Manifiesto de Lanzamiento," Montafias de Colombia, F ARC, May 28, 1996, pp. 1-6. 
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At the same time that a short term plan for local control is ongoing, a long term plan 
to continue and maintain an armed struggle is being implemented. Their overall strategic 
plan, "Campaiia Bolivariana por una nueva Colombia,"16 has four phases: 
1. First Phase: (1990-1992) Creation of a new party, training of terrorists 
overseas, to gain control of the Magdalena middle valley in the center of the 
country, increase personnel to 18,000 men in arms, and 60 fronts throughout the 
country. Increase financial sources to US$56 million of dollars, increase urban 
guerrillas in Santa Fe de Bogota, Medellin, Cali. 
2. Second Phase: (1992-1994) Improvements in foreign relations gains through 
Cuba and Mexico, to pressure the government in the peace negotiations using 
such tactics as: Increase personnel to 32,000 men in arms and 80 fronts, 
increase finance sources to $200 million of dollars, acquire weapons and 
communications materials, airplanes, etc. 
3. Third phase: (1996-1998) Instigation of a general strike, reduction of the 
economic growth of the nation, terrorism in the cities, creation of a headquarters 
for a staff of the guerrilla leaders, creation of a popular government, creation of 
a new constitution and control of the cities by the guerrillas. 
4. Fourth phase: (1998-2000) The accomplishment of this phase will be 
according to the development of the first three phases. If the first three phases 
are not successful the groups will continue the armed struggle until they rea~h 
their goals. 
At the current time the F ARC have achieved some objectives in their original plan 
including expanded financial resources (more than US$500million of dollars by this year) 
and an increase in the number of fronts (73 including the urban fronts). The increased 
number of the armed followers (32,000) and broadened popular support cannot be achieved 
in the short term, even during this present government. The development of the Operation 
Conquer by the Army created a popular turmoil by the peasants against the eradication 
program. However, even with this success the plan will have to wait for better political and 
military conditions for further development, especially in the political arena. 
16 This strategic plan "Bolivarian Campaign for a new Colombia" was created on April10, 1989, in La 
Uribe( former position of the FARC leaders untill990 when the Colombian Army operation destroyed that 
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The ELN is working to apply international human rights laws and standards in the 
conflict with the purpose of achieving political and international support of the guerrilla 
movement. At the same time ELN has rejected moves towards a peace process or peace 
talks because it considers the current government to be illegitimate and because of the 
influence of drug money in the last campaign. This group plans to show an image of the 
revolutionary fighting for peace and democracy, and to create socialism in Latin America. 
ELN is attempting to legitimize the Marxist-Leninist philosophy with a real example in a 
new nationalist movement in Colombia. 
The group's defining characteristic is the struggle against petroleum exploitation and 
the profit made from the natural resource by Colombian economic institutions and foreign 
investors. The ELN is the most radical of the guerrilla groups in Colombia. During the First 
National Military Conference and the 14th National Plenum, in July, 1995, the ELN 
changed some of the important aspects of their tactical and strategic plans by launching the 
National Tactical Plan, 1996-1998. 
They changed the concept of the "five front war" to "seven national strategic areas." 
• Area One is "Dario de Jesus Ramirez in the northeast of Antioquia 
• Area Two is ABC (Arauca, Boyaca, Casanare) 
• Area Three is the middle Magdalena River 
• Area Four is Mares Province 
• Area Five is the suburbs ofBucamanga 
• Area Six is the frontier area 01 enezuela) 
• Area Seven is the Coffee area (Caldas, Quindio, Risaralda) 
position). This plan was designed by the F ARC's VIII Conference in 1982. 
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2. Political and Military Objectives 
The following section will consider the goals of both organizations. These goals 
were publicly announced at the last plenum or conference that each group had in the last 
two years. Some of the objectives presented are only a tactic to be developed. The group's 
tactical objectives placed in the big picture show the group's strategy. 
a. F .A.R. C. (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 
The following are the publicly announced political and military objectives of 
F ARC. For this information this study uses two different sources, a F ARC communique17 
and information from the Army Intelligence Agency:18 
1. To develop the "strategic plan" called the Bolivarian Campaign for a new 
Colombia. The name of the strategic plan is very close to the name of the new 
political party that they are creating. For this purpose they will try to increase 
the number of fronts 19 to 80, each one with 400 men in arms, to total 32,000 
men. They will be assigned to two major strategic tasks, the first one with 
16,000 men is a mobile guerrillas unit assigned to the strategic center of 
struggle, and the second is 16,000 men formed into a mobile guerrilla unit 
assigned to make war throughout the country. 
2. Acquisition of weapons and explosives especially from Peru, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Venezuela and Central America. 
3. To increase the activities to prevent the eradication program for illicit drug 
products. To Influence the development of strikes and popular protest against 
the government and US influence. If possible, to take control of the peasants and 
lead them in a popular uprising against the government. 
4. To create a new clandestine party called "Bolivarian Movement for a New 
Colombia, " in order to acquire political support as a pretext to seize po~er in 
close coordination with the PCC, and UP (Patriotic Union). 
17 "Manifiesto Octava Conferencia de Las FARC-EP," La Uribe, FARC, April2, 1993, pp. 1-5. 
18 Ejercito Nacional, "Planes y Proyecciones Grupos Subversives, Direcci6n de Inteligencia Ejercito," Santa Fe 
de Bogota June, 1996. 
19 The term "Front" means a guerrilla military organization with approximately 50- to 100 members in arms that 
develops operations in a given zone. It is a territorial unit 
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5. To move the rural conflict to the urban areas. Because this is the last stage of 
insurrection, they plan to increase the logistic support from the big cities, using 
the Bolivarian militias or urban fronts as an example. · 
6. To begin the actions in order to bring about the First National Offensive by the 
end of 1996. The plan is to execute attacks on multiple military targets and 
create disorder and chaos to measure the level of compromise of the people . 
7. To insist on international mediation of this conflict and the defense of the 
Human rights. 
b. E.L.N. (National Liberation Army) 
This information is from an analysis of the most recent national conference 
(III Congress Heroes and Martyrs for a new Colombia, 10-20 October 1993 20 and I 
National Military Conference "Manuel Vasquez Castafio" July 1995). 21 In the III Congress 
"Edgar Amilkar Grimaldo", in July 1996, these two groups developed their military and 
political objectives: 
1. To change of the concept of the five front war to seven national strategic areas. 
2. To create the FMA (Area Military Force ) and the EMA (Area Staff 
Headquarters) with the purpose of organizing the military force in a structure 
like regular infantry battalions in the period 1996-98. 
3. To implement the Code of War (C6digo de Guerra) in order to gain influence 
with the international agencies for human rights. 
4. To create the BRMs (Mass Revolutionary Bases) in both the rural and urban 
areas for support of militias in Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Bucaramanga. 
5. To increase the attacks on pipelines to interfere with the oil policy of the 
government and private foreign investment in the oil business. 
6. To increase contacts with the National Conciliatory Commission ( CCN). 
20 "I Conferencia Nacional Militar," ELN, July 1995, pp. 1-54. 
21 "18 Preguntas al Cura Perez o 'Poliarco, '" El Tiempo, Sep. 1, 1996, from Internet. 
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7. To develop a plan to infiltrate the armed forces with the two goal of 
assassinating military leaders and, creating an active counterintelligence 
network. 
8. To create a military school to educate the leaders and commanders pf the 
guerrillas units. 
3. Organization and Strategic Location 
This section presents the current configuration of the two primary groups of 
guerrillas. This section will answer the following questions: 
• What is the nature of both military organizations in the different level of 
coordination and chain of command? 
• What is the number of members in each group? 
• Where are the groups located? 
This section will address the numbers of members by front in each of the different regions 
where groups have developed activities. There is also a comparative analysis with other 
guerrilla groups in Latin America to see the relationship of these groups with the 
Colombian groups. It is not possible to include both guerrillas groups as one guerrilla 
movement because their differences do not permit a common analysis. 
After the peace process of the Betancourt government in 1986, the guerrilla leaders 
of the FARC, ELN, M-19, and EPL, agreed to create the "Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon 
Bolivar (CGSM)."22 This would be a large organization and require cooperation between 
the groups. The new organization would impact both the prospects for revolution and the 
stabilization of the country. But the required coordination of these movements was almost 
impossible to achieve for a variety of reasons. The first one was the peace process ofM-19, 
EPL, Quintin Lame, in 1991. The second reason was, their difference in goals, in financing, 
recruitment, policies for peace in recent years. The third one was the intellectual outlooks of 
22 This organization was created with the purpose of coordinating and centralizing the revolutionary effort. The 
members of this wereFARC, ELN, M-19, EPL, and Quintin Lame groups. 
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the leaders between the FARC, M-19, and ELN. These are some of the reasons that do not 
permit a full cooperation between groups. It is therefore unlikely to take place among 
guerrillas groups at least in the short term. Even so it is important to consider the future role 
of the CGSM in a peace negotiations process, because it will be a factor in any peace talks. 
a. FARC 
An explanation of the organization and location of the F ARC group in 
Colombia can be given in the following way: The F ARC group is a rural guerrilla 
organization, and it has a national secretariat. The group is integrated through the seven 
members who are at the same time commanders of the different blocks. Before the 
"Colombia operation" in December 1990 its national secretariat was localized in a single 
place. Now as a result of that experience it is a mobile command (CM). The central general 
staff is made up of 25 members; the same seven commanders plus 18 more commanders 
who are responsible for logistics, fmances, administration, and the inspection committee 
organization. There are six blocks of war, each one consisting of an estimated 600-1000 
men with arms.23 The Central Commander is responsible for the security, finances, and 
communication of the national secretariat. This unit consists of an estimated 380-400 men 
with arms. There are 61 fronts each one consisting of 50-1 00 men with arms. Those fronts 
form the blocks, each front has three committees responsible for fmancing, political 
intimidation, and intelligence. Normally the fmancing is from the block. The block is based 
in the cities or towns so that it may manage the funds or resources in permanent contact 
with the fronts. There are sixteen mobile companies attached to a block. Those companies 
are the first stage in becoming a front. This happens when the unit reaches the full 
complement of people and arms needed to developed activities. Normally two or three 
companies make up one front, each company has an estimated 20-30 men with arms. 
23 Men in arms means combatant guerrilla member either men or women. Each one has normally a rifle and 
basic equipment, and some military training as guerrilla. 
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The smallest unit of this organization is the guerrilla or commission. It is a 
unit of 10-15 intended for special assignments. Its organization is the basic military form 
well known in history. The most conservative estimate of the number of armed members is 
approximately 6,000 men and women. The following graphic shows the actual structure of 












This guerrilla group has either influence or a presence m 25 of 33 
Departments and in approximately 400 towns.24 Other sources indicate that about 22525 
municipalities or towns have some level of influence from the F ARC. 
The difference in information from each source is due to the way each 
source manages the information. Newspapers have the purpose of reporting news, but the 
National Police information is based on intelligence or a defector. The F ARC presence and 
influence of this group is in the central part of the country, along the East Cordillera and the 
valley of Cauca and Magdalena River. There is also some influence in the department of 
Caqueti, Huila, Meta, and Casanare, Cundinamarca, Santander, Cauca, and Antioquia. The 
F ARC have the largest number of guerrilla positions with the purpose of controlling the 
heart of the country and holding a strategic position that will split the country in two well 
defined areas, the flat land and the mountains. 
24 Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, "Bajo Chantaje," Semana, August 19-25, 1996, from Internet 
25 National Police, Revista de Criminalidad 1994 (Santa Fe de Bogota, Imprenta Fondo Rotatorio de !a Policia, 
1995), p.l49. 
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The organization and positions that appear in Table 2 come from both 
government sources26 and guerrilla documents. This table shows the level, structure, and 
Table 2. F ARC Organization and Location 
Organization Member Location Front 
National Secretariat 7 N. Caqueta, S Tolima 17-21-25-50 
380 E, Caqueta, S, Guaviare, Uraba, Middle CpNorth 
Magdalena 
National Head Quarters 25 Around Country 
Blocks 
19-35-37 41-59- 550 Guajira, Magdalena, Atlanttico, Sucre, Cesar, N 
Bolivar, 
50 FU Jose 
Antequera 
Northwestern Block 600 Antioquia, N Choc6,C6rdoba 5-9-18-34 
Part of Risaralda, Caldas 36-47-57-58 
45 FUJMC 
Middle Magdalena Block 600 Santander, S Bolivar, S Cesar 04-11-12-20 
E Antioquia, W Boyaca. 23-24-33-46 
Western Block 450 Valle, Cauca, Narifio, Caldas 06-08-29-30 
50 Tolima, Risaralda, S Choc6 FU.M.Cepeda 
40 CP .A. Cortes 
Eastern Block 1,200 Meta, Cundinamarca, Arauca 1-7-16-22 
Casanare, Vichada, Guainia 26-27-28 








Southern Block 829 Huila, Caqueta, Putumayo 2-3-13-14 




40 R. Lozada, 
"COPAV" 
Central Command 389 Tolima, Quindio, Valle 17-21-25-50 
40 Cp.Norte 
40 Cp Joselo 
TOTAL 5,685 Combatants 
26 Ejercito Nacional, "Planes y Proyecciones Grupos Subversives, Direcci6n de Inteligencia Ejercito," Santa Fe 
de Bogota. 
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membership assigned to each block. This is the latest data available with their location or 
influence area (See Appendix for map, Figure 6), and the name of the unit. 
From Table 2 and the F ARC organization and location;' it can be assumed 
that the model of organization presented brings three methods for the development of 
orders, plans, or politics in the accomplishment ofF ARC objectives. 
The first method is through the regular chain of command. In this particular 
case by radio, letters, messages, or the use of codified mail to transmit the instructions. 
The second method is according to the concept that Maria Jose Moyano 
established in the Argentine example, and applied in the Colombian case would be: 
... the cellular structure according to the principle of 
compartmentalization, where an individual only knows the identity of the 
members of his or her own cell, and that of a member of another cell who 
acts as nexus. 27 
' The third method is "the wave of circumstances" or individual decisions of a 
local leader. This leader is assumed to make decisions in support of the general objectives 
of the organization. This concept is the "wave system" and is a policy of deep 
decentralization at each one of the levels of this organization. At the development of a front 
this policy is useful to create a level of initiative. In the long term, however, the policy may 
create a dangerous and out of control unit because of the natural response of local leaders. 
Indeed with the narco-trafficking as a principal source of financing, this policy increases the 
level of illegitimate conduct. 
Another important consideration is the topography and geography of 
Colombia. Geographical factors do not make it easy to control some regions. Mountainous 
regions and jungles far from the urban centers also effect issues of the location of the armed 
forces in country. 
27 Maria Jose Moyano, Argentina's Lost Patrol (New Haven, Yale University Press 1995), p. 139. 
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b. ELN 
This organization was initially created as another "Guerrilla Foco," and in 
1973 was changed to the urban guerrilla. At this time the ELN is a combination of both 
rural and urban guerrilla structures and organizations, with its strongest influence in the 
large cities of Colombia; Bucaramanga, Medellin and Santa Fe de Bogota. 
This group maintains its forces in the areas where natural resources are 
exploited by foreign and national companies, particularly the areas of oil, gold, gas, and 
coal in the central and north part of the country. The ELN has a national direction by two 
commanders, the ideological and the military leader. The ELN has five war fronts supported 
by 300-1000 men in arms. The ELN also has seven C.R.A. (command regional area). These 
areas have some common features and social-economical conditions. The ELN urban and 
rural front are established for the purpose of coordinating their political, military, and 
financial activities. Each C.R.A. has three to five rural cuadrillas?8 
The ELN resource are 34 cuadrillas, each with 50-100 men in arms, four 
mobile companies, with 30-70 men in arms, normally with attached explosives experts, and 
twelve urban fronts for military training. Units have weapons and expertise available to 
accomplish terrorist acts in the ~ities. Information on the ELN structural and organization is 








Figure 2. ELN Organization 




The most conservative figures indicate that the ELN has approximately 
3,404 combatants. The group's influence has grown in the last six years from 18 towns in 
1989 to 44 towns or regions in 1996. The departments of Bolivar, Cesar, Boyaca, Choc6, 
Cauca, Arauca, Antioquia, and North and South Santander are regions under ELN 
influence. Later in Chapter three we will explain the concept of guerrilla influence. 
Table 3 shows the ELN organization and distribution and the special 
characteristics of the organization, the different levels of the structure, the number of 
members at each level, their location (See Appendix for map, Figure 7), and the name of the 
units. 
Table 3. ELN Organization and Distribution 
Organization Membership Location Cuadrillas 
Northern War Front 810 Guajira, Cesar, N Santander 14-12-16 
Bolivar, Sucre, Atlantico, 26-34-19 
Cesar 
Magdalena, Cordoba, Uraba. 24-04-33 
FU 05-08 
Cp S. Bolivqr 
Northeastern War Front 1,019 Santander S&N, Arauca, 07-02-18 
Cesar, Antioquia, Bolivar 17-08-03 




Northwestern War Front 800 Antioquia, Choc6, Uraba 10-01-30-32 




Southwestern War Front 510 Huila, Tolima, Valle, Quindio 06-15-05-27 
Risaralda, Narifio FU 07-09-06-11 
Central War front 265 Cundinamarca, N Tolima, 25-29 
W Casanare, NE Boyaca FUOI 
TOTAL 3,404 Combatants 
From Table 3, 1t can be assumed that this orgaruzat10nal model allows for 
three ways of communication and development, and to implement orders, plans, or politics 
and accomplish ELN objectives. 
The first method of communication is the normal chain of command of the 
organization. In this particular case by using radio and mail. One of the most important 
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characteristics of this guerrilla group is that the organization is commanded by two leaders. 
Normally the decisions of the ELN come from these internal authorities.· The second one is 
the cellular structure described earlier. 
In the case of the ELN the compartmentalization is more important than in the F ARC 
because they have some urban fronts where this cellular structure works better to avoid 
infiltration and destruction of those groups by the government. 
The third method is different from that of the F ARC organization because 
the control of the ELN organization is very tight. The decentralization of each of the levels 
of this organization is less likely than in the F ARC. 
It is important to consider the sources of financing of the ELN. The ELN is 
well controlled and very centralized. This works to its advantage in extortion of foreign 
companies or in the planning and realization of attacks on pipelines, and the kidnapping of 
personnel from companies that do not pay that extortion. Coordination is made possible by 
the organization of the C.RA, the rural, and the urban fronts with centralized national 
direction. 
c. Other Groups in Latin America 
This section will present for comparison a brief analysis of other guerrilla 
groups in Latin America over the last four decades. Some of these groups are now inactive 
or have moved to the political arena. Some are at the peak of their political moment and will 
provide a spectrum to measure the level of development of the guerrilla groups in 
Colombia. The easiest way to measure these guerrilla groups is the level of membership in 
their movements. The first group addressed will be the Cuba guerrillas according to 
Timothy Wickham-Crowley: 
The 26th of July movement (M-26), as it was known, spread and grew to 
several hundred rural fighters plus other urban supporters by early 195829 
29 Wickham-Crowley, p. 16. 
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The M-26 July had less than 1,000 men when Castro took power in that 
small country. Another important actor was the Sandinista guerrilla group that in 1979 took 
power as a second successful example of a guerrilla revolution in Latin America. In the case 
of El Salvador the FMLN had more than ten thousand members before the peace 
negotiations opened. In Guatemala the URGN has perhaps six thousand members. The 
Peruvian movement, Sendero Luminoso, had between three to five thousand members 
before the capture of its commander Gonzalo. In the case of Venezuela, the F ALN may 
have reached between 1,000 and 2,000 guerrilla members. In 1975 in Argentina according 
to Maria Jose Moyano: 
The Montonero movement had a total of 3,500 members and the ERP an 
estimated 1,500 members 30 
After examining the guerrilla movements in different countries of Latin 
America, each one of these movements in particular stages of their armed struggle, 
Colombia's guerrilla movement is not only the oldest but is also the largest in comparison 
to other countries and presents the most difficult problem to solve. The size of the Colombia 
groups must be of some concern, because in the other examples political problems were 
solved with different outcomes over a period of ten to twenty years. However, problems 
remain in Colombia after 40 years and there is no light at the end of the tunnel. 
4. Financing a Revolution or Maintaining the Status Quo? 
In order to answer this controversial question, it is necessary first to note that some 
people believe the guerrillas do not have relations with the narco-traffickers and others 
think, that the linkage is clear and has permitted the groups to increase their power. Some 
consider that the narco-trafficking is in fact the only reason that the groups are able to 
maintain the armed struggle in Colombia. An analysis of the financing system and its 
sources of income for both F ARC and ELN is necessary.31 
30 Moyano, p. 104. 
31 La Rotta, p. 95. 
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External aid is an unnecessary consideration, because, at this time with the 
breakdown of the former Soviet Union external financing does not take place. All sources 
are internal and the result of internal variables with different origins~ According to the 
International Herald Tribune: 
The insurgency has not only survived the fall of communism but has 
actually prospered-the rebels are now more numerous and more powerful.32 
The evolution of the financing system of the guerrillas has changed through time and is a 
complex structure that is an integral part of the economic market of Colombia. In May 
1996, the Economist accurately summarized the Colombian guerrillas financing and 
growth: 
The guerrillas seem to be getting more numerous, richer, better armed 
and more widespread. Current estimates put the number of armed men at 
more than 10,000. They are to be found in 450 municipalities, more than 
half the total guerrillas in the entire country. They have shown little 
inclination of late to negotiate. . . . and the incentive not to talk is large: 
Millions of dollars flow into the rebels in ransom payments for kidnap 
victims and narco- trafficking activities.33 
The following section will address the different sources of financing, with 
kidnapping, and narco-trafficking proving the link with both business in Colombia and 
narco-guerrilla. A summary of the guerrilla financing system with its different sources of 
national and international ftmds will be used to prove that the Colombian guerrilla groups 
have extensive resources for maintaining their armed struggle. Their primary task to obtain 
these resources is not only to challenge the current government and the civil society, but is 
also necessary in orderJor the guerrillas to accomplish their long term political and military 
objectives of seizing power and changing the political system. 
32 Gabriel Escobar, "Colombia Insurrection Becomes a Civil War," International Herald Tribune, November 2, 
1996, p. 2. 
33 "Colombian's Guerrillas Flourish as its President Fades," The Economist, May 7-11 1996, p. 37. 
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a. Extortion 
This kind of crime was a traditional source of financing in the sixties. 
However, lately it has become a more sophisticated and specialized method designed for a 
specific victim. This type of extortion is generalized throughout Colombia. Later in this 
section a table will present the scope and influence of extortion and the derived income by 
each group. Both guerrilla groups work using essentially the same system. This crime is 
against business people in all categories. These people do not inform the police or the 
authorities in most of the cases because they fear the consequences. It is very important to 
differentiate the types of extortion because of the way the Colombian judicial system and 
the authorities identify the crime. Extortion is split into various crimes, but is made up of 
the extortion of cattlemen, mineral resources such as oil, gold, coal, etc. and other illegal 
activities, for example, maintaining transportation check points and threats of cattle stealing. 
In the case of extortion of cattlemen, this method exists throughout 
Colombia, but is usually found in areas where the main income is based on herding. 
Colombia was a former cattle exporter but today people avoid investing in a business where 
the profit will be going to the guerrilla groups. Sometimes this sounds like a joke, but in 
some regions the guerrillas kidnap cows and extort money for their return. Another 
technique is to ask for money every month using letters or dead notes, they call "boleteo" or 
"Vacuna."34 The amount of money that the groups receive from this crime according to 
Jesus La Rotta is "321,000,000 dollars per year."35 
In the case of check points and hijacking, the long routes of the commercial 
sectors of Colombia are difficult for the police to control and are subject to these crimes in 
regions outside of the control of the police. Groups often to fifteen men block the highway, 
looking for military people, and collecting money from the tourists. Owners of cars and 
sometimes the large companies must pay to pass the checkpoint. If they refuse their vehicle 
34 The "Boleteo" means a bill to support the revolution, The "vacuna" means the shooting to support the 
revolution. 
35 La Rotta, p. 101. 
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is burned or the driver is murdered. The number of cases reported for this crime is more 
than 2,780 per year. However, the amount of money generated by this method is very 
difficult to calculate. The source for this information is news on radio, TV, or in the 
newspaper. Because this crime is part of Colombian life outside of the big cities, control by 
the government is almost impossible. Some authors put the estimate of total income from 
check points and hijacking at US$ 133 million per year.36 
h. Extortion in the Resources Sectors 
This crime is the consequence of a new generation of guerrilla leaders who 
have implemented an efficient financial system that has led to the growth of the groups. 
This section will address the different kinds of extortion related to natural resources like oil, 
gold, and coal. Guerrilla groups, especially the ELN, and to a lesser extent the FARC, have 
used this method. This kind of extortion is directed at nationals and foreign companies or 
multinational organizations, and is a specialty of the ELN. The following is a summary of 
this particular extortion operation: 
(1) Oil. This financing source is the most productive, especially for 
the ELN. They target large companies that have signed agreements for the purpose of 
stopping the kidnapping of employees, especially foreign, and to. avoid the attacks on the 
property. The ELN may threaten kidnappings or pipeline explosions unless they are paid off 
in advance, or blow up the pipelines and then collect money from the companies hired to 
repair the damage. According to Bloomberg Business News: 
The rebels blew up the pipeline 229 times over a five-year period, 
spilling 683,214 barrels of oil. The oil industry, both the private and state 
owned, was also affected by the guerrilla attacks. State oil company 
Ecopetrollost US$514 million over the period, while private oil companies 
lost US$395 rnillion.37 
36 Ibid., pp. 104-105. 
37 David Scanlan," Colombian rebels Cost Nation $12,5 Billion since 1990," Bloomberg Business News, Latino 
links Enterprises, Inc., 1996, from Internet. 
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Another source EL Tiempo (the most important newspaper in Colombia) in a study over a 
ten-year period found: 
The ELN blew up the pipeline (this pipeline is 1250 miles, the longest in 
the country) 417 times, spilling 1,413 billion of barrels, the oil industry has 
lost US$40,175 million.38 
Furthermore, The New York Times estimates that: 
... the guerrillas collected US$140 million a year from the oil 
companies ..... nevertheless, oil company officials acknowledge that 
guerrillas may have infiltrated the worker's unions and control many local 
politician ... they suspect that the guerrillas extort money from the 
subcontractors. 39 
(2) Mining. The mining sectors for both gold and coal have 
problems with the guerrilla groups, especially in the departments of Antioquia, Cauca, 
Choc6, and Guania. Companies such as Mineros de Antioquia and Coldragados have made 
statements on this situation and according to the weekly magazine Cambio 16: 
.. they paid US$1 0 million a month. Otherwise the guerrillas would for 
example in the town El Bagre Antioquia, blow up company installations and 
kidnap or kill people.40 
In the case of coal in the department of Cesar for example the large companies, Guajira, 
Boyaca, and Cundinamarca, the extortion figure is US$130 million. 
c. Kidnapping 
This is the most common crime committed by the guerrilla groups, but is a 
specialty of ELN. According to the Colombian weekly magazine Semana (The most 
important newsmagazine in Colombia): 
During the last 20 years in Colombia there have been 10,442 
kidnappings ... the average ransom is US$250,000 dollars, and for a foreign 
kidnapping the ransom would be on the average US$4 million. The guerrilla 
38 "Voladuras dejan Perdidas por $78,700 million," El Tiempo, Santa Fe de Bogota, July 5 1996, from Internet. 
39 Diana Jean Scheme," Oil Companies Buy an Army to Tame Colombia's Rebels," New York Times, August 22, 
1996, p. A7. 
40 "La guerrilla Millonaria," Cambia 16, July 17, 1995, Santa Fe de Bogota, p. 48. 
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groups at this time have 3,000 men available to do kidnappings in 
Colombia41 
The following table on kidnappings in 1995 in Col~mbia includes the 
number of kidnappings, the ransom in millions of dollars, which people were victims, 
foreign or nationals, the source of the information, and the percentage that is attributed to 
the guerrilla groups. 
It is estimated that only 10% of cases are reported to the authorities. For this 
reason establishing a pattern for calculating the number of people kidnapped and the profit 
for each guerrilla group, is almost impossible. However, using figures from different 
sources gives the results in Table 4 and also generates an estimate of the income from 
kidnapping. 
Using Table 4, guerrilla income by kidnapping during 1995, the number of 
cases varied from 1 060 to 2965. The annual income from Kidnappings varied from 
US$659 million to US$150 million. Some kidnappings are of nationals and some are of 
foreigners. The last column in the table shows the different percentages that each source 
gives. The most conservatives figures are given by the Colombian National Police. For the 
purpose of using an estimate of the kidnapping source of fmancing by the guerrilla groups, 
According to the Colombian National Police: 
... taking the 43% of the 1293 cases of kidnapping throughout Colombia, 
that are attributed to the guerrillas, the FARC committed 261 cases, the ELN 
270, the dissident group EPL 27 and the dissident group M-19, committed a 
total of 564 kidnappings in a single year, 1995.42 
41 "El Cartel del Secuestro," Semana, August 13-17,1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
42 Ibid., p. 141. 
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Table 4. 1995-Kidnapping 
Total Number of Annual income Foreign National Source % of Kidnapping Attribute to 
Kidnappings in Dollars Guerrilla 
2965 Cases $659,5M * * LaRotta'+j 70% 
1,158 Cases $530,0M 45 1113 Semana44 90% 
1,060 Cases $58l,OM 45 1015 E1Tiempo4) 
1,400 Cases $150,0M 35 1365 NYT46 96% 
2,300 Cases $329,0M * * Lat.Link4l 
1,293 Cases * * * National PoJ4lS. 43% 
* mformatton unavatlable 
d. Budget Deviation 
This method was created as a consequence of the political reform in 1986 
and the popular elections of mayors and councils in small towns or municipalities. At that 
time it became possible to control local elections through intimidation; newly elected 
candidates must follow a political program that satisfies a local guerrilla leader's wishes. Of 
course, the budget is diverted to the guerrilla groups' fmancing system. An example of this 
situation is the Narifio Department, where the 29th F ARC front: 
... this front got almost US$2.0 millions of dollars from the 40 
municipalities of Narifio Department. However a figure for the entire 
country is about US$60 million49 
Another example of this situation is Arauca Department, where the money 
that came from the oil bonus for exploitation is invested according to the instructions of the 
ELN. The amount of money in that particular situation is significant. These cases are ail 
example of what guerrilla groups call local influence, or the people's power to participate in 
the local decisions. This builds political support for the guerrillas. 
43 La Rotta, p. 185. 
44 "El Cartel del Secuestro," Semana. 
45 "El Secuestro en Cifras," El Tiempo, March 20, 1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet 
46 Steven Ambrus, "Colombian Aims to Ransom Nation From Kidnapers' Grip," New York Times, Nov 10, 1995. 
4 7 Scanlan, from Internet. 
48 National Police, Revista de Criminalidad 1994, p. 92. 
49 La Rotta, p. 191. 
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The list of mayors of different municipalities that have been kidnapped or 
killed is growing in length every day. The mayors must pay with the municipal budget for 
protection of themselves or their families. According to World Press Review: 
... of the 1,100 mayors elected in 1992 throughout the country, 17 had 
been killed, according to the National Federation of Municipalities, and 
another 225 say they have been threatened by guerrillas. 5° 
A short explanation of how public money finds its way to the guerrillas is 
found when the original destination is people hired to work in a position that does not exist 
or approval of contracts to do public works with people recommended by the guerrillas. 
Later the project is not finished and the responsible people disappear. Sometimes the 
personal security of some mayors is provided by the guerrillas in order to maintain the 
mayors under their control. If the guerrilla loses control of the mayor, then the mayor is 
killed or possibly some member of his family. Another way to implement local control is by 
changing a local decision in favor of someone, thereby creating confidence and gaining 
political support for the guerrillas. 
f. Narco-trafficking 
In the early 1980s the guerrilla leaders became aware of the necessity for 
other sources of financing. Because the guerrilla foco has been almost eliminated and the 
political circumstances in Colombia do not led a revolution as the case of Cuba and 
Nicaragua. Even the traditional political parties and the government push the repression 
against the subversive groups. This crisis pushed the Colombian groups into the initial 
marriage with the narco-traffickers. The groups provided security and protection. They 
assumed that the narco-trafficking would become the engine of their revolution and the 
political protest that they thought before to size the power and change the political system. 
The rapid growth of the guerrilla groups began at this time. 
50 Isabel Vincent, "Colombia's Oil Backfires," The Globe and Mail of Toronto, from World Press Review, 
December 1994. From Lexis-Nexis Electronic Service. 
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The ELN group's principal financial activities are kidnapping, the extortion 
and taxing of companies that exploit the natural resources, gold, coal, oil, gas, with the 
narco-trafficking activities playing a minor role. The F ARC group receives their principal 
financing from the activities of narco-trafficking and cocaine production. 
This is a controversial subject because the linkage between the narco-
trafficking and the guerrillas has become almost a myth. But recently Colombians have seen 
a strong relationship between guerrillas and the drug groups. In some US government 
agencies, people have begun to change their analysis, and over the last few months have 
changed from the link which was improbable to the definition of a desk officer in the 
Pentagon: 
they participated in the process of producing illicit drugs in different 
stages, therefore the link is clear.51 
General Barry McCaffrey said in March 8, 1995: 
Drug production and trafficking continue to be the major regional 
problem which affects all the nations of the Latin America. In Colombia, for 
example, the murder rate is nearly ten times than of the United States, most 
of these deaths are directly related to narco-guerrilla activity. Cultivation of 
coca in Colombia has increased by more than 20% in the past two year52 
Later in November 2, 1996 the anti-drug czar refers to the guerrilla groups as: 
Colombia's 10,000 guerrilla drug traffickers53 
The first document of F ARC which mentions this· subject openly came to 
light in 1982, according to the Colombian Armed Forces: 
This document was elaborated during the Seventh National guerrilla 
conference and it contains the guiding principles assumed by the fronts 
about the drug issue. The fronts are ordered to preserve the balance between 
the production of cocaine and the family consumption crops and carry out a 
51 Interview with Allison Major, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, 30 
September 1996, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 
52 Barry MacCaffrey, "Prepared Statement Before the House National Security Committee," Defense Issues, 
March 08, 1995 vol. 10, No. 50, p. 3. 
53 Escobar, p. 2. 
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special indoctrination work among cocaine-leaf raisers to have them on the 
side of the guerrilla groups54 
It is important to consider figures that show the dimension of narco-business 
for the guerrilla groups. Later this study will address how the guerrillas obtain money to 
sustain their armed struggle based on this concept of narco-guerrilla. This will be presented 
in Chapter III along with the guerrillas influence and peasant support. 
The following table presents the annual income of the guerrilla groups from 
narco-trafficking activities as compared to money, weapons, and strength of the guerrilla 
groups in millions of dollars. The evidence presented confirms the linkage of some of the 
guerrillas to production and other services provided to this illicit business such as: 
protection, growing, processing, check points and chemical precursors. Before presenting 
the table this study will consider an example according to the Colombian Army: 
If we take the figures computed for the fifteenth front in the southern part 
of Colombia, which had two financial commissions the Caguan 
commissions and the 15th commission, that is, multiplying by two the 
amount of money received by each commission, we obtain a rough figure of 
US$10,500,000 per front which is the money received from cocaine 
production alone. This does not include the money received as payments for 
kidnapping, or other crimes described before. Altogether, the block income 
sums up the total ofUS$73,500,000 then the FARC reaches a great total of 
approximately US$514,000,000.55 
From sources used for the following table it is difficult to estimate. These sources do not 
show the amount of money for each group. However, this author estimates that the money 
is divided, 85% for F ARC, and 15% to ELN. 
54 Ejercito Nacional, Grupos Narco-Terroristas Cartel de las FARC, unpublished, August 10, 1996, p. 6, 
Infonnation presented to the U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C. 
55 Ibid., p. 17. 
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In Table 5 the annual income of narco-trafficking activities for both guerrilla 
groups shows that this is a real phenomenon. 
Table 5. Narco-trafficking Financing Going to Guerrilla Groups 
Annual Income (1995) Group Source 
US$ 701,0 M CGSM Lat.link56 
US$ 718,0 M CGSM El Tiempo57 
US$ 175,2 M CGSM Washington Posf8 
US$1115,0 M CGSM* LaRotta59 
Table 6 is a summary of different sources of fmances for the guerrilla 
organizations. The average amount in each case assigns 85% to the F ARC and 15% to the 
ELN in the cases of narco-trafficking. In the case of kidnapping, 43% of all the kidnapping 
(guerrilla related) in the country during 1994 was assigned 45% to FARC and 55% to ELN. 
In the case of mining, gold and oil, all was assigned to the ELN, and 50% to each group was 
assigned for the extortion of cattlemen, checkpoints, and budget divergence. 
Table 6. Summary Guerrilla Financing System 
Organization FARC ELN 
Extortion 
Billeting to Cattleman US$ 156M US$ 155M 
Check-point US$ 66M US$ 67M 
Piracy 
Natural Res. Extortion 
Oil US$ 140M 
Gold US$ 130M 
Kidnapping US$87M US$ 106M 
Nationals 
Foreign 
Budget Deviation US$ 51M US$ 9M 
N arco-trafficking US$575M US$ 102M 
TOTAL US$935M US$2836M 
56 David Scanlan, "Colombian Rebels Cost Nation $12.5 Billion Since 1990," from Internet 
57 "Interview with Admiral Holdan Delgado Villamil," El Tiempo, August 18 1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from 
Internet. 
58 Douglas Farad, "New Focus: Political Violence," Washington Post Foreign Service, January 15, 1996, from 
Internet. 
59 La Rotta, p. 232. 
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This table shows the guerrilla groups' significant financial resources. Both 
groups collect sufficient resources from different sources to maintain and even increase 
their attacks on the government. The F ARC receives more than 50% of their income from 
narco-trafficking. The ELN receives more than 50% from the extortion of the big 
companies that exploit oil, gold, and coal in Colombia. This group has a minor participation 
in narco-trafficking and growing of cocaine. But if the group requires more money it may 
compete with the F ARC in the northern part of the country. The cost of maintaining a single 
guerrilla combatant for a month is US$ 500; times twelve months this is US$6,000; times 
11,000 members, for a year US$ 66 million; The armament cost, and other major logistic 
components are not included. Not all the money the groups receive goes to a common fund, 
normally the distribution is among the leaders of a front or block, or the money is sent to 
banks in Panama. The fact is that not all this income is invested in the guerrilla movement. 
S. How Guerrillas Develop Activities60 
Table 7 is organized by departments, with data on the actions of the guerrilla groups 
during a year. The source for this data is the Colombian National Police during the year of 
1994.61 The definition of the activity is events that were executed by the guerrilla groups 
with the purpose of attacking government forces or state institutions or for some other 
purpose such as: financing of the group, gaining influence, and presence, or in support from 
the civilian population, propaganda, recruitment. 
This information allows some measurement of guerrilla activities and provides a 
sense of the seriousness of this conflict. The table shows the level of operations, influence, 
and presence of the guerrilla groups. It is necessary to create a scale to measure the real 
level of operations or influence over the different regions. The elements will be the number 
of guerrilla fronts, both rural and urban; the number of instances of extortion, kidnapping, 
60 It is clear that the criminal activities of the guerrilla groups become operations in the academic meaning. 
61 Colombian National Police, Criminalidad 1994, Centro de Investigaciones Criminologicas, Santa Fe de 
Bogota, Imprenta Fondo Rotatorio Policia, 1995, pp. 50-53, 55-61,141, 165. 
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Table 7. Guerrilla Activities 1994 
Department Front Front Extor Terro Kidn Kidn Assault Narco PO 
FARC ELN tion rist FARC FLN 
Actio 
ns 
Amazonas 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 57,017 
Antioquia 3 9 18 121 17 49 43 249 I,825,I50 
Arauca 0 2 2 46 4 6 3 0 99,04I 
Atlantico I I 2I 23 0 I 0 697 I,779,49I 
Bolivar 1 3 I7 42 5 I5 3 707 1,506,813 
Boyaca 3 0 IO I8 8 7 5 32 I,299,I60 
Caldas I I 34 5 I 0 5 683 920,648 
Caqueta 5 0 IO 24 16 0 4 47 324,950 
Casanare 2 I 5 21 7 7 7 I8 I86,508 
Cauca 3 1 9 51 8 20 I7 265 959,693 
Cesar I 4 5 99 1 47 I5 50 834,270 
Choc6 I 2 8 5 3 13 6 9 332,I93 
Cordoba 1 0 1I 5 7 I 0 85 I,I49,887 
Cund/marca 7 0 10 43 19 0 18 171 1,722,009 
Guajira I I 4 28 I 5 8 82 363,368 
Guainia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13,294 
Guaviare 3 0 2 2 4 0 5 0 . 69,580 
Magdalena I 1 9 44 8 14 3 28 I,010,I50 
Meta 7 0 I4 I4 22 0 13 53 594,030 
Narifio 1 1 28 16 15 4 6 298 1,192605 
N/ Santander I 4 75 I20 2 25 12 237 I,039,I12 
Putumayo 3 0 I 9 9 0 2 25 238,029 
Quindio 1 1 6 3 1 0 2 I213 422,116 
Risaralda 0 0 52 21 0 4 1 2765 762,982 
Santander 5 4 10 108 14 49 15 34 867,911 
S. Andres 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 43 43,247 
Sucre 1 2 15 15 5 12 6 56 628,738 
To lima 4 2 36 33 12 0 1I 881 1,212,532 
Huila 4 2 19 18 7 0 12 215 806,020 
Uraba 2 1 11 26 52 1 7 53 410,388 
Valle 1 1 25 I4 5 1 6 279 I,557,952 
Vaupes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37,241 
Vichada 2 0 1 2 2 1 1 3 19,573 
Bogota. AM 4 1 88 92 0 0 10 I736 5,13I,582 
B/mangaAM 1 2 13 57 0 12 0 246 820,213 
Cali AM 2 0 5 50 4 0 2 761 1,882,843 
Medellin AM 1 2 34 174 2 2 2 1433 2,399,159 
TOTAL 74* 49** 6IO 1352 261 296 250 13460 34,519,495 
Front: Number of front by Department 
Kidn : 11 Kidnapping 
* this number means 62 fronts and 12 Mobil Companies F ARC 
** 11 11 11 34 fronts and 4 11 11 and II Urban fronts ELN 
AM : This means that those cities have some suburban zones and they are the biggest cities, with more than one 
million of inhabitants. 
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assaults on populations, terrorist actions; and some measure of the narco-traffick.ing 
activities; the guerrilla's location, and the population in each department or major city. 
Based on the data in Table 7 it can be concluded that these criininal organizations 
have increased their illicit activities in comparison with the last five years. Summarizing the 
data in Table 7: there were 610 extortions of different kinds, in the case of extortion the 
victims normally are reluctant to inform to the legal authorities, so the level of impunity is 
ve:ry high. There were 1,352 terrorist acts, 261 kidnappings by the FARC, 296 kidnappings 
by the ELN, 250 assaults to population and towns, and 13,460 crimes related to illicit drugs 
in all the stages of production and commercialization. 
A relation of crimes and the departments can be presented in the following way: 
1. Of the 37 regions studied, only five departments do not have the presence or 
influence by guerrilla groups. They are the farthest from the center of the 
country. 
2. The five departments with the highest level of terrorism activities are Antioquia, 
North Santander, Santander, and Medellin AM. They also they had the largest 
number of guerrillas. 
3. The regions where kidnapping by guerrillas are greatest are Antioquia, 
Santander, Uraba, Cesar, North Santander, Meta, and this coincides with the 
presence of the guerrilla groups. 
4. The regions where the guerrilla assaults are the greatest are Antioquia, 
Cundinamarca, Cauca, Santander, Cesar, Meta. 
5. The regions where the presence of guerrilla groups are the largest are Antioquia, 
(12), Cesar, (6), Cundinamarca, (7), Meta, ( 7), North Santander, (5), Santander, 
(9), Tolima, (6), Huila, (6), Cesar, (5),Caquet8., (5). 
After this analysis it is important to make clear one point. According to the 
definition and scales proposed above, the most likely municipal influence appears in the 
departments where the activities or actions of the guerrilla are greatest. But some data is 
incomplete, the size of the population is limited, the channels of information are limited, 
and the guerrilla actually have only limited control. Some regions appear to have medium 
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levels of actions, such in the case of Guaviare, Putumayo, Arauca, Uraba .. However, in those 
areas or regions, the guerrilla operation is increased because of the relation with the drugs is 
more important then that of other crimes, like kidnapping or assault. 
6. The External Aid 
At this time the only external support for the guerrilla groups is trade among arms 
smugglers and narco-traffickers. Therefore, for the purpose of this study this kind of 
logistic support will be considered as external aid. However, it is very clear to anyone in 
Colombia that the guerrillas do not receive any kind of external support to cont~ue the 
armed struggle from other governments or organizations. The weapons market operates 
outside of international law and may be a possible connection with the narco-traffickers or 
trans-national criminal organizations. There is smuggling through Panama and Venezuela. 
In the case of Venezuela the F ARC and ELN can collect weapons and armory caches either 
by sizing the Venezuelan troops in the border or by paying Venezuelans for that material. 
It is important to remember that the initial support for these groups came from the 
Cuban revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. According to Timothy Wickham-Crowley: 
The peasant republic of Marquetalia received some initial organizing help 
from Cuba and Chinese instructors. Later on the ELN, usually described as 
Fidelista in its Politics, began with the training of an entire cohort of its 
leaders in Cuba before returning to Colombia for its military activity .62 
More evidence of Cuban influence is related by Jorge Castaiieda: 
The M-19, the Cubans, and the name of Jaime Guillot Lara, who died in 
Havana of a heart attack. With this death, most likely, was buried conclusive 
proof of the Cuban-Colombian guerrillas link. In this case, the Cuban 
involved both in drugs and in shipping arms to M-19. He was arrested on 
December 4, 1981, in Mexico City.63 
Another author says that: 
62 Wickham-Crowley, p. 31,89. 
63 Jorge Castafieda, Utopia Unarmed (New York ,Vintage Books, 1993), p. 113. 
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Since 1980, the Castro regime has been using Colombian Narcotics ring 
to tunnel arms, as well as funds, to Colombian Guerrillas. In October, 1981, 
the Cuban government sent $700,000 to purchase arms.64 
Some later evidence of the foreign support and the influence of Cuba among the 
Colombian guerrillas was the negotiation during the kidnapping of Juan Carlos Gaviria and 
the intervention of the Cuban Government. Mr. Gaviria was kidnapped the 2 of April 1996 
by a guerrilla group. He is the brother of the former Colombian president Cesar Gaviria, 
now the General Secretary of the OAS. The influence in this kidnapping by Castro can be 
summarized in the following way, according to the weekly magazine Semana: 
Fidel Castro personally ordered the special emissary of the leader of the 
guerrilla group to release Mr. Gaviria's brother. At the same time the OAS 
produced a communique against the Helms-Burton act as a pay off for the 
release.65 
On the other hand, it is very important to take into consideration an unusual issue. 
This is the dramatic case of the aid from the Colombian guerrillas to Cuba. This information 
is from two sources. The sources indicate talk of payback for the support of the Castro 
regime. The first is the newspaper La Prensa and the second source is Jesus La Rotta: 
The ELN using false companies shipped coal to Cuba by boat from the 
hand Venezuela frontier. Sometimes they send money in cash to Cuba. On 
the other some ransom paid in dollars through European non-governmental 
organizations are going to Cuba to support the communist regime. The 
second somce said ... that the pay back to Cuba was sent by using drugs, 
coal, or cash for a significant amount of money US$700 million to cover 
weapons and trainers given to the guerrilla groups.66 
The conclusion of this section on external aid is that it does not exist. However, in a 
political way Cuba has supported these guerrilla groups. That political support is behind the 
Cuban relations with Colombia. Now as Wickham-Crowley said in this case, all the 
64 Arrieta, Orjuela, Sarmiento, Tokatlian; Narcotrafico In Colombia ( Santa Fe de Bogota, Tercer Mundo 
Editores 1990), p. 223. 
65 "LaHistoria Secreta," Semana, June 15, 1996, pp. 1-12, from Internet. 
66 La Rotta, p. 332. 
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resources come from internal sources. However, in the Colombian case, the smuggling of 
anns could lead to a different view with the presence of the narco-traffickers, experts in 
weapons smuggling, and an open door for laundering money. This evidence according to 
Bruce Bagley who said: 
There may well also have been a connection between drugs and anns 
flow. If you can smuggle drugs out of Colombia, the same basic channels 
can be used to smuggle into Colombia, and that appears to have happened in 
a number of cases67 
According to others authors: 
... by different sources we know that the guerrillas have established 
contacts with narco-trafficking with the purpose not only of exchanging 
drugs for anns but also to allow them to move into different countries 
especially Cuba, Mexico, and Eastern Europe and to obtain international 
knowledge and free access to the black market anns68 
The strongest evidence of this is in the Uraba region on the border with Panama where the 
struggle is among F ARC, ELN, and groups on right wing to maintain control of this door to 
weapons and channel to drugs. According to the newspaper El Tiempo: 
During the first four months in Uraba, municipalities of Turbo, Carepa, 
San Pedro de Uraba, Currulao, and Apartado had accomplish 15 attack 
against civil population with over 157 people killed, this area is in dispute 
between F ARC and self-defense groups.69 
B. THE STATE MILITARY POWER 
This section will consider some aspects that explain the situation of the anned 
forces in the violent political conflict in Colombia. Some problems for the anned forces are 
in that struggle against the guerrillas. In the first place the informal pressure that this actor 
receives from civil society, the NGO, the US government in the cases of human rights 
67 Bagley, p. 96. 
68 Arrieta, eta!., p. 232. 
69 "Historia de Dolor y Muerte," El Tiempo, May 6, 1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
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violations and drug war, and the Venezuela government in the case of the border incidents 
with the guerrilla groups. 
Additionally internal military resources should be addressed. It is the author's belief 
that the budget for the Colombian armed forces is not enough to maintain internal control in 
a country with the highest level of violence in the world, and one of the most powerful 
criminal, narco-traffickers, and largest guerrillas movements in the World. Another problem 
is that Colombia has the weakest judicial system in Latin America. The purpose of this 
section is to show the lack of internal military resources that sets limitations on the ability of 
the government to crush the guerrilla capacity or at least to reduce that capacity of the 
guerrilla groups. 
Other variables are the effects of external military assistance, the organization and 
distribution between the armed forces and National Police, and the low percentage of 
military aid in comparison with the National Defense Budget. 
This section will also present the most important operational results from the Armed 
Forces agains_t the guerrilla groups and narco-traffickers in the last five years. This will 
allow a comparison with the effectiveness of those guerrilla groups. This information will 
show the efforts and results of many operations by the armed forces. 
A question to be answered in this study is: "Why can't the government crush the 
guerrillas?" The government has forces that are modern and professional with experience in 
guerrilla warfare over 40 years in a country that does not have deep cultural grievances, 
racism, or religious problems. In the words of Malcolm Deas: 
... concerns about the concepts of the political conflict in Colombia, in 
comparison with other countries especially in Latin America where poverty, 
famine, oligarchies and under development countries do not have the level 
of violence of Colombian society. That society does not present big 
differences between castes, a more unfair social economic system than Peru, 
Bolivia, and other countries in the last 40 years. 70 
70 Malcolm Deas, Fernando Gaitan, "Reflexiones sobre Ia Violencia Politica en Colombia," First Section in Dos 
Ensayos Especulativos Sabre Ia Violencia en Colombia (Santa Fe de Bogota, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1995), 
p. 17. 
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How can the government implement measures to increase the budget, reform the 
judicial system, establish policies against narco-traffickers, an anti-insurgency policy, and 
involvement of the all government and civil society in the solution of this tragic situation? 
At the conclusion of this chapter the author will answer the question as to whether 
there is a real equilibrium in Colombia. 
1. Informal Pressures 
The informal pressures is part of some problems for the armed forces and the 
government are in that struggle against the guerrillas, among then the following: 
• The informal pressure that the armed forces receives from the civil society. 
• The NGO, and the US government in the cases of human rights and drug war. 
• The Venezuela government in the case of the border incidents with the guerrilla 
groups. 
Before explaining who pressures the Colombia Armed Forces, and for that purpose, 
the words of scholar Robert Clark should be considered. He addresses how a government 
may solve a situation like Colombia's. The idea of Clark is that the pressure that comes 
from different sources push the government in different directions with only a limited 
number of possible outcomes: 
Most violent insurgencies seem to end in one of two ways. One way is 
for the government in power to combine a vigorous policy of repression of 
the rebels with a judicious program of reforms, thus isolating the insurgents 
from their base of popular support and· eventually defeating them militarily 
and politically. The second way is for the government's armed forces and/or 
the police to lose either their taste for combat or their confidence in the 
regime, and for the government itself to lose its legitimacy with the people. 
But the history of contemporary armed insurgencies suggest, then, that very 
few of them end as a result of a negotiated general truce or cease-fire.71 
In Colombia a solution to this conflict will not be found easily. The conditions are 
complex, not only because of the makeup of the guerrilla groups and the effectiveness of the 
71 Robert Clark, Negotiating with ETA (Reno Nevada, University of Nevada Press, 1988), p. 1. 
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government. There is a need for real commitment in the whole society before the real 
process of peaceful coexistence can begin among all the actors of Colombian society. 
During the last 40 years the political violent conflict in Colombia was only in the 
hands of the armed forces and the guerrilla groups. Other actors had only a passing 
influence. The political or economic level of compromise between the groups and the 
Colombia armed forces has been very low. The normal direction of a compromise in 
Colombia is to pursue interest and influence, and get the best parts of the political pie for 
your group before any thought of the best solution to Colombia's problems. 
The pressures on the armed forces come from three different sources. First pressure 
from Colombian civil society that considers this conflict dangerous to the future of the 
country. In an armed struggle it is very difficult to promote the consolidation of democracy, 
political participation, solutions for social and political problems, investment, security, 
education, production, economic development for all of the society. Second some pressure 
is domestic and some foreign, such as the case with non-governmental organizations 
(NGO's), who support human rights. The NGOs have an important role in this conflict, 
because they can bring about solutions if they are totally apolitical, if not they become a 
tool for other sectors in the conflict and the source of foreign pressure is by the US 
government that has special interest in the control of production and interdiction of illicit 
drugs in Colombia. 
Third, pressure from Venezuela over the problems on the Colombian borders and 
Venezuela political instability in the last five years. Venezuela pursues the Colombian 
guerrillas incident on the borders to relieve internal political pressure with a nationalist anti-
Colombian campaign. According to Raul Torres a Venezuelan Navy officer: 
The Venezuelan government perceives the Colombian guerrilla 
movement to be a phenomenon that intensifies bilateral tensions between the 
two countries. 72 
72 Raul Torres, "Venezuela and Colombia: Border Security Issues," Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 1994, p. 37. 
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2. Organization and Distribution of Armed and Security Forces 
According to the Colombian Constitution, the president of the republic serves as 
Commander in Chief of the country's military and police forces. The president appoints the 
armed forces highest ranking officer to serve as head of the General Command of the 
military forces. In early 1990 President Gaviria appointed for the first time in 50 years a 
civilian as Minister of Defense. The current minister is also a civilian. That political change 
in the position has increased the level of civil- military relations. This was the beginning of 
an acknowledgment that defense problems are the. responsibility of the entire political 
administration and head of the government. 
The 1991 Colombian Constitution establishes a nonpartisan, apolitical military. 
Articles 216 trough 223 of the constitution restrict the military's right of assembly, except 
by order of legitimate authority. In addition, these articles states that military and police 
personnel are ineligible to vote while on active duty and are not permitted to be candidates 
for elective office. 
The army has primary responsibility in counter-guerrilla operations. These 
operations are normally established in regions of difficult access even by air or river. These 
operations requires a large force in comparison with the national police or the other three 
forces. The air force or the navy provide support for the army operation in varying ways. 
a. The National Army (EJC) 
In 1995, the national army was composed of 119,000 active duty personnel 
including 70,000 conscripts. The troops under the command of the army represented some 
75% percent of Colombian's total military personnel. The army has total responsibility for 
the public order in Colombia due to the increase of political violence and gives support to 
the national police and legitimate institutions. However, the army also has a plan for 
international conflict. The organization and configuration of this force is designed to fulfill 
its two major responsibilities: defense against internal and the external threats. 
Each of the five army divisions have territorial command over 115 of the 
country's military regions in the national territory. Each division is organized into three or 
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four brigades, each brigade has two counter-guerrilla battalions. A national command is 
organized in the following way: 
1. The I division is responsible for the northern part of the country. It has the 2nd 
brigade responsible for the departments of Atlantico, Guajira, Magdalena, and 
North part of Cesar. The 17th brigade, is responsible for the departments of 
Uraba, north of Choc6, and north part of Antioquia. The 4th brigade is 
responsible for the departments of Antioquia, the west part of Choc6, and 
Magdalena valley. The 11th brigade is responsible for departments of Cordoba 
and Sucre. 
2. The II division is responsible for the central-east part of the country. It has the 
5th brigade is responsible for departments of North Santander, Santander, 
Sought part of Cesar, and south part of Bolivar. The 14th brigade is responsible 
for Middle Magdalena. The 16th brigade is responsible for departments of 
Arauca. The 18th brigade in the department of Casanare, and North part of 
Vichada. The 1st Brigade is responsible for departments, Boyaca, and west part 
of Casanare. 
3. The III division is responsible for the southwest part of the country, it has the 
following units, the 6th brigade is responsible for departments of Tolima, North 
part of Huila, and South part of Caldas, The 8th brigade is responsible for 
departments ofQuindio, South part ofChoco, and North part ofValle. The 3rd 
brigade is responsible for departments of Valle, Cauca, Narino, CEP, and 
Putumayo. 
4. The IV division it is responsible for the southeastern part of the country, with 
the following brigades: The 7th brigade is responsible for departments of Meta 
and East part of Vichada. The first special forces brigade is responsible for the 
Department of Guaviare. The CUO, is responsible of the departments of 
Guania, Vaupes, and the west part of Vichada. The 9th brigade is responsible for 
Huila, and north Caqueta. The 12th brigade is responsible for Caqueta, and west 
part of Guaviare. The CUS, is responsible for the department of Amazonas. The 
division Commander has under his command the CUO and the CUS. and the 
new special forces brigade in San Jose del Guaviare. 
5. The V division it is responsible for the metropolitan area of center of the 
country, with the following units: The 13th brigade is responsible for Bogota 
AM, and Cundinamarca. The 1Oth brigade is responsible for South 
Cundinamarca and North Tolima. 
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6. . Other troops as the 20th brigade of intelligence and counterintelligence, the 15th 
brigade with the seven training school by branch, the 21th brigade of logistic 
support. The military academy and the war college. 
Each brigade has three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, one 
engineer battalion, one logistic battalion, one military police battalion, and one or two 
counter guerrilla battalions consisting of 400 professional soldiers. 
Additionally, the army has three counter guerrilla brigades with 1,200 
professional soldiers, and 50 counter guerrilla battalions with 400 professional soldiers 
each. 73 These brigades are mobile and are moved where the guerrillas are strongest. 
However, these mobile troops have a limited mobility because the number of helicopters is 
not great enough to move these battalions simultaneously. This capability is necessary in 
operations against the guerrilla groups especially in areas where the geographic and 
topographic conditions are difficult. 
b. The National Navy (NA VlJ 
In 1995, the national navy had about 20,000 personnel including 6,000 
marine conscripts, and 1,500 coast guard personnel. Personnel under the command of the 
national navy represent 12% of the country's total military forces. 
From 1978 to 1988, the navy's corps of marine infantry benefited from a 
gradual build up. The marine corps was organized into five battalions. Two battalions each 
reported to the Atlantic marine brigade and the pacific marine brigade. These brigades 
corresponded to the navy's Caribbean command and the pacific command, respectively. 
Coordinated marine and army operations were carried out frequently during the late 1980s 
under the operational control of the army. 
73 The professional soldier has at least two years in the Army and receives a US$250 dollars a month. The Army 
has 30,000 soldiers, in counter guerrilla units. 
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c. The Colombian Air Force: ( FAC) 
The Colombian air force had 12,000 personnel in 1995, including 3,500 
conscripts. This force is 8% of the country's military forces. 
The F AC has five bases around the country; and each one has two fighter 
squadrons. Three squadrons are dedicated to counterinsurgency missions, including a 
squadron of helicopters, heavy and light, a reconnaissance squadron and a transport 
squadron. The mission for this force is to support the mobility of the army for counter 
insurgency purposes. 
d. The National Police (PN) 
In 1995, the size of the national police was 110,000 personnel, of whom 
approximately 10 percent were civilians. The headquarters of the national police is located 
in Santa Fe de Bogota, and it is supported by regional departments in large cities. 
In addition to the force's primary responsibility for handling common 
crimes, its major responsibilities included narcotics interdiction, some counterinsurgency 
work, participation in civic action in rural areas, and riot control in the country's urban 
centers. A number of special police units functioned under the overall jurisdiction of the 
headquarters operations command. They included the radio patrol group, the anti-mugging 
group, the private surveillance group, the highway police, the tourist police, the juvenile 
police, the railroad police, and the operational group against extortion and kidnapping. The 
most important unit is the anti-narcotics police with a small air section equipped with 38 
light helicopters and airplanes. 
e. The Security Administrative Department (DAS) 
The DAS is the principal organization responsible for enforcement of laws 
relating to national security. This organization has a national role comparable to that of the 
Federal Bureau of Investigations in the United States. The formal responsibilities under the 
DAS's mandate includes investigation of crimes against the internal security of the state, 
fraud against the state and its financial institutions, and crimes affecting individual liberty 
50 
-and human rights. The DAS has responsibility for screening and maintaining records of 
foreigners who enter the nation and for enforcing immigrations laws. To carry out its 
mission, the DAS has both investigative and intelligence-gathering responsibilities. This 
organization answers to the minister of interior. 
f. Why Can't the Government Crush the Guerrilla Groups? 
After this description about the state military power, it is important to 
answer one of the most logical questions. Why can't the government crush the guerrilla 
groups? An answer to this question must include the three aspects which will be discussed 
in the following section. 
(1) Not Enough Budget. This aspect was made clear in the above 
section in the discussion of internal resources and the international aid especially from the 
United States. However, according to the weekly magazine Semana: 
The resources that the Army has only meet 45% of the weapons 
necessary, 32% of the communications necessary, 48% of the mobility and 
transport requirements, 75% of the logistic material such as boots, uniforms, 
special elements for combat purpose, also the Air Force has only 50% of the 
required capacity in support of counter insurgency operations (troops 
mobility).74 
(2) The Government Does Not Have the Necessary Judicial 
Tools. The tools to apply justice to those who maintain a struggle against the establishment 
do not currently exist. The following issue appeared in the newspaper EL Tiempo by 
Gabriel Rosas V.: 
We don't have a national strategy against the narco-guerrilla. For 
example, during 1995 the Armed Forces captured 6,000 guerrillas in 
different circumstances, the Armed Forces spent time, money, troops, effort, 
planning, later 5,800 were liberated by the judges.75 
74 "Economia de Guerra," Semana, Informe Especial, September 24, 1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
75 Ismael Medina, "Militares Mas Plata pero con Resultados," El Tiempo, September 21, 1996, Santa Fe de 
Bogota, from Internet. 
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-Later the Minister of Defense points out: 
.. .It is necessary to develop a national security policy that helps to solve 
the problem because until now the narco-guerrillas, narco-trafi,ickers, not 
only make a joke of the justice system, but also use it against the legitimate 
authority. The narco-traffickers are now expert in using the law for their 
convenience.76 
Some of the measures to create a strong judicial system that would 
support the armed forces were stated by General Harold Bedoya Pizarro; the national army 
commander: 
.. among them, measures to protect military operations :from the action of 
"tutelage." The Attorney General does would not have authority to 
investigate or take sanctions against the military members. The army can 
detain criminals for seven days for investigation. The creation of a national 
militia. Allow the functions of judicial police by members of the armed 
forces. Allow military mayors in municipalities or regions where the public 
order is difficult to maintain. Armed forces acting on evidence based on 
intelligence. A special agency to help military personnel under 
investigation. 77 
(3) Narco-trafticking in the Society. This is the most important 
problem that prevents the armed forces from crushing the guerrilla groups. This crime has 
the capacity to corrupt the public sector. It also provides solutions for the peasants in short 
term for their economic problem. It appears to be a job to the people who do not have any 
other option. 
3. Internal Military Resources 
The Colombian defense budget from 1970-1996 (Table 8) shows the financial 
resources used to maintain public order and national security, to fight against the guerrillas, 
control narco-trafficking and the production of illicit drugs. The following table shows the 
distribution of expenses for personnel, regular expenses, transfer of funds among the 
76 Juan C Esguerra, "Mindefensa Propone Nueva Estrategia de Seguridad National," El Tiempo, September I 9, 
1996, Santa Fe de Bogot:i, from Internet. 
77 Harold Bedoya P, "Reforrnas para Ia Fuerza Publica," El Tiempo, September 6, I 996, Santa Fe de Bogot:i, 
from Internet. 
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national entities and budget for investments in equipment and technology. Figures can be 
compared between the defense budget and the national budget. Also displayed the GDP and 
its respective percentage for the purpose of comparing the money that the armed forces has 
to assign in its strategy to solve this kind of conflict. 
* 
Table 8. Defense Budget, 1970-1996 
Year National Total %GDP Personnel Expendi- Transfer Investment 
Budget Defense tures 
Budget 
1970 17.87 2.91 2.2591% 1667.10 0.61 0.40 0.28 
1971 21.84 5.01 3.3179% 2075.30 0.61 0.52 1.87 
1972 23.83 3.63 1.9744% 2248.00 0.53 0.55 0.38 
1973 29.39 3.98 1.6909% 2362.00 0.77 0.67 0.26 
1974 37.54 4.87 1.5604% 2941.00 0.77 0.91 0.35 
1975 51.64 6.85 1.7444% 3781.70 1.08 1.48 0.63 
1976 55.27 7.83 1.5178% 3975.20 1.23 1.56 1.18 
1977 74.32 10.11 1.4574% 5299.10 1.63 2.44 0.90 
1978 102.12 13.78 1.1961% 6861.20 3.71 2.29 1.13 
1979 151.51 19.85 1.2975% 9589.00 4.74 4.03 1.79 
1980 199.18 27.74 1.8131% 12253.50 5.70 7.01 3.15 
1981 269.97 33.71 1.7546% 16517.30 6.45 9.06 2.20 
1982 333.70 41.64 1.7207% 22107.60 6.80 11.02 2.39 
1983 406.26 65.74 2.2213% 31201.80 12.69 16.44 6.38 
1984 536.51 86.93 2.3262% 40175.30 8.98 20.46 18.56 
1985 675.19 99.23 2.0621% 48904.30 12.64 23.80 15.40 
1986 946.26 128.09 1.9474% 65300.00 11.57 29.38 23.86 
1987 1208.26 169.75 1.9954% 85674.00 18.62 38.39 29.72 
1988 1635.89 243.56 2.1426% 114408.70 28.03 49.36 55.31 
1989 2218.88 315.56 2.1529% 148498.30 30.05 57.85 83.77 
1990 3036.52 355.76 1.8150% 195199.80 40.56 28.92 97.13 
1991 4234.10 453.42 1.7924% 252601.70 81.30 59.37 67.98 
1992 4959.61 679.98 2.0938% 363497.20 127.92 81.73 118.10 
1993 6487.50 1070.05 2.5325% 514492.00 248.94 116.99 205.59 
1994 9797.26 1256.01 2.2997% 744540.00 244.41 182.46 107.69 
1995 12201.23 1719.96 2.5040% 953583.00 298.25 339.11 158.58 
1996 16915.10 2347.20 2.7842% 1159607.50 332.56 581.18 309.81 
0 • .. 
Thts budget was prepared by the Colombtan Mmtstry of Defense, Plannmg Office, m mtlhons of pesos 
and converted to millions of dollars at the current rate ofU.S.$1 = 1.032 pesos 
For a country in the circumstances of both conflict with the guerrilla and the narco-
trafficking, there is not enough money to create conditions to unbalance the current 
equilibrium and put sufficient pressure on guerrilla groups for peace negotiations. As 
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everyone understands, it is impossible to totally eliminate the guerrillas even in a country 
with a modem industrialized infrastructure. 
During the last ten years the increase in the GDP average for armed forces only .5% 
and this was for salaries of the personnel. Resource of 2.1 percent of GDP is not sufficient 
to control violence in Colombia. The increase in the last five years of the defense budget 
does not represent a real increase because 13-15 percent of the total budget is for 
investments and about 87 percent is for common and current expenses. Most of the 
expenses are routine costs and not new investment in equipment or increases in the number 
of professional soldiers. Another figure about the Colombian armed forces, the armed 
forces personnel per 1000 population is 4. The GNP per capita is U$1,339 and this is 
insufficient for a substantial increase in the defense budget under current economic 
conditions. 
4. Operational Results of the Armed Forces 
With the purpose of comparing the Colombian armed forces78 operations against the 
guerrilla groups, the following table presents the number of engagements. These 
engagements represent combat between the armed forces and guerrillas groups. 79 The 
number of guerrillas captured is displayed because there is a relationship of captured 
guerrillas and crimes. After a combat situation some guerrillas became captured or they give 
up must taken to the judges of the Attorney General within the 72 hours.80 In the same way 
the fatalities have to be recognized by judicial authorities as guerrillas or criminals. 
The table includes the number of operations to search and control an area against 
those guerrilla groups. Also shown is the number of known desertions from the guerrillas 
groups or surrenders to the legal authorities are included. The data is collected by army 
78 Ejercito Nacional, Estadisticas Ultimas Acividades Grupos Armadas, unpublished, Direcci6n de Inteligencia, 
Santa fe de Bogota, August 28, 1996, pp. 1-18. 
79 The Colombian army has the primary responsibility in this kind of operation; other forces support these 
operations. 
80 One of the most significant problems of the armed forces is that most of the guerrillas captured are later 





Headquarters 24 hours a day. The data presented is from January 1, 1990 through 
December 31, 1995. 
Table 9. Armed Forces Operations and Results ·, 
Operation Group 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Total 
Search ELN 235 203 280 438 468 573 2197 
FARC 87 272 342 581 561 641 2484 
Total 4681 
Engagement ELN 133 110 212 214 190 229 1088 
FARC 157 333 370 361 386 331 1938 
Total 3026 
Captures ELN 337 295 311 471 582 671 2667 
FARC 96 230 293 618 480 645 2362 
Total 5029 
Surrenders ELN 12 19 25 61 25 61 203 
FARC 29 52 53 250 152 134 670 
Total 873 
Fatalities ELN 237 193 291 325 225 252 1523 
FARC 209 445 506 411 414 360 2136 
Total 3659 
From Table 9 armed forces operations, there are some mterestmg facts. For 
example, the difference in size of the ELN and F ARC is almost 1 :2. The number of 
captured is larger for ELN. The explanation is that the ELN has more urban front and the 
possibility of capture is higher. Another issue in this table is the small difference between 
casualties between ELN (1,523) and F ARC (2,136), even though the ratio is 1:2. 
In each of the groups 10% percent of their members leave for different reasons. In 
the total of search operations against ELN and F ARC, 4,681 in five years, 65% end in 
combat situations or engagements. This means a high probability of combat in these 
operations. 
The three most important results of an analysis of this table are, First, that the armed 
forces has a high level of efficiency in this struggle against the guerrilla groups. In the last 
five years, the number of captures (5,029), fatalities (3,659) and surrenders from the 
guerrillas groups (875) for a total of 9,161 guerrillas, while the armed forces had 2,354 
fatalities in the same period. This represents 25% of the guerrilla fatalities. The second 
result of this analysis is the real capacity of recovery that the guerrilla groups must have to 
maintain the level of conflict intensity. The third result of that table is the lack of judicial 
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legislation to stop the judges who release most (85%) of the captured. Because the judicial 
system favored the criminal and not the state. And also the groups' method of recruitment, 
and the money they invest to keep a guerrilla force at constant illegal activities could 
explain this capacity to recover. Another possible issue is the effect ofnarco-trafficking. 
5. External Assistance 
The military aid from the United States over the last five years is decreasing, in 
particular the aid for counter-insurgency purposes in response to the end of the Cold War. 
Another is that in the recent years the policy makers are disengaging the US from Latin 
American countries, because of the end of Cold War. Moreover, the United States foreign 
policy in the current government has changed. The only thing that receives any important 
amount of money is for local drug enforcement. These moneys and grants are channeled 
through the National Police and anti-narcotic military units. In 1997 the military aid will be 
cut as a result of the tensions between the United States and Colombia and the de-
certification of the Colombian government in the struggle against narco-trafficking. 
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Figure 3. U.S. Military Assistance 1991-199681 
81 U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, 1981-1998, Office of the 
Budget, Bureau for Management, US Agency for International Development. 
56 
The US military aid is divided into economic support funds, (ESF), foreign military 
fmancing, (FMF), international military education and training, (IMET), and the 
international narcotics control, (INC), and (FMS) Foreign Military. The figure shows an 
average of US$30 million a year. That figure represented 0.42% of the internal Colombian 
defense budget. For 1996 the money was expended in INC rather than IMET due to 
strained political relations between the two countries. 
Washington's main interest in the Andean countries and specifically in Colombia, is 
the drug war. The US purpose is to reduce or control the growing, producing, shipping and 
interdiction of coca and poppies products at their source. Therefore the military aid is not 
targeted at the counterinsurgency effort. According to the US Southern Command: 
The United States' interest is based in supporting the national counter-:-
drug strategy, with a big pay off possible in the source countries. 100% of 
the world's cocaine comes from South America. In 1994 the cocaine 
production in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru was 840 metric tons. Also in 
1994 the World wide seizures: 303 metric tons of which 97 metric tons were 
in South America. 82 
C. SUMMARY 
The summary of this chapter has to deal with the primary actors of this conflict, the 
government armed forces and the guerrilla groups. Those results of this analysis will led to 
the following points: 
1. The guerrillas' General Strategy and the Informal Pressures on the 
Armed Forces 
The Colombian guerrilla groups are now at the point of no return in their purpose of 
changing the political system. The F ARC group pursues its strategic plan called "Bolivarian 
Campaign for a New Colombia," and the ELN has changed their strategic plan from five 
war fronts to seven national strategic areas. The ELN and F ARC tactical and strategic 
82 MacCaffi:ey, p. 10. 
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objectives are to maintain the armed struggle, gain international political support through 
the NGO and to be recognized as major forces. 
The state military power has the objective to maintain law and order in Colombia 
based in the national Constitution. The government armed forces receive informal pressure 
in this confrontation from different sources. 
The first source is a civil society that feels itself in an insecure environment. 
Citizens that suffer attacks from the guerrilla groups want protection for themselves and 
their property. 
The second source of pressure is the international NGOs. These organizations claim 
that human right rules apply to this kind of conflict. However, the guerrilla groups use the 
NGOs as a tactic against the armed forces. 
The third source is the influence by other countries such as Venezuela, and the 
United States. Venezuela's case is related to the border incidents with some guerrillas 
groups. In the case of United States, it is their policy to fight the commerce of illicit drugs. 
This policy includes an eradication program to stop the production at the source. 
2. Organization and Strategic Location of the Guerrilla and the 
Government Armed Forces 
The original guerrilla organization of the 1960-1970s has changed. Both guerrilla 
groups have different concepts of block or sectors in country. The guerrilla groups are now 
faced with a high probability of military failure. This is taking into consideration that 
maintaining a level of secrecy and security is more difficult in a larger organization. In a 
cellular structure organization with high levels of compartmentalization secrecy and 
security can be maintained at the expense of rapid communication (ELN). Better 
communication and flexibility of the wave system of control is possible but all levels of the 
organization become dangerous to themselves and to the goals of the organization (F ARC). 
This particular situation becomes critical in the case of crimes, narco-trafficking, 
kidnapping, or the extortion of large companies. 
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The ELN, to improve its organization, has created the C.R.A. Control Regional 
Areas coordinate the rural and the urban fronts of the ELN. ELN attempts to control the 
eastern chains of mountains that divide the central part of Colombia with the eastern 
flatlands. 
The army has 30,000 professional soldiers, officers, NCOs and 70,000 conscript 
soldiers assigned to counter-guerrilla units. The role of the other forces, navy and air force, 
is to support land operations. The national police have responsibility in the urban cities and 
against the trafficking of illicit drugs and common crimes. 
The explanation of why the government and the armed forces cannot crush the 
guerrilla groups is made up of three important factors: 
• Not enough budget. There is only the 2. 7% of the GDP for the guerrilla war, and 
almost 80% is expended in personnel and regular acquisitions rather than 
investment in new technology or equipment. 
• The judicial tools are inadequate, to capture and keep under observation 
members of illegal organizations for a efficient amount of time. 
• There is no national strategy against narco-trafficking. A national strategy would 
reduce the effect ofnarco-trafficking on the society. 
3. The Financing of the Guerrilla Groups and the Internal and External 
Resources of the Armed Forces 
The guerrilla financing system presents a special problem. Because the guerrillas 
have reliable resources from narco-trafficking and other traditional sources, the Colombian 
guerrilla groups have the largest guerrilla membership and a huge financing system in 
comparison with other guerrilla groups in Latin America. The guerrilla groups are 
maintaining the status quo rather than pressing for a revolution in Colombia. Their objective 
is not the revolution of Cuba or Nicaragua. They are trying to get a political solution with a 
high political and monetary profit for them as in the case ofEl Salvador. This reason pushes 
them to acquire financial resources from their traditional source of kidnapping, and now 
narco-trafficking and the extortion oflarge companies. 
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The F ARC group has narco-trafficking as its principal source. F ARC receives US$ 
935 Million a year :from this source. On the other hand, the ELN uses extortion and 
kidnapping as its principal source of financing and has received US$579;million a year. The 
ELN has participated very little in narco-trafficking. 
The budget of the armed forces to reduce the guerrilla influence is US$2,400 billion 
and is divided with all the agencies and institutions that make up the Colombian Ministry of 
Defense. Over the last ten years the increase in budget was 0.5% of the GDP. Eighty seven 
percent of this annual budget is for common and current expenses. Most of these expenses 
are routine costs and not new equipment or an increase in the number of professional 
soldiers instead of conscripts. The ratio of armed forces per 1000 population is 4, the GNP 
per capita in Colombia is US$1,339. 
4. Armed Forces' Operations And Guerrilla Activities 
From the analysis of the guerrilla activities during 1994, it can be shown that those 
criminal organizations had increased their illicit activities. The level of guerrilla activity is 
3,000 incidents a year. To summarize: 610 acts of extortion, 1,352 terrorist acts, 565 
kidnappings, 250 assaults to towns, and 13,460 crimes related to illicit drugs in all stages of 
production and commercialization. 
In the case of the armed forces operations, the two most important outcomes are 
presented in Table 9. First, the armed forces has a high level of efficiency in this struggle 
against the guerrilla groups. The second result of this analysis is the real capacity to recover 
by the guerrilla groups. In conclusion, this balance is evidence of an equilibrium between 
the guerrilla groups and the Colombian state and the armed forces. 
In the last five years the army has inflicted numerous fatalities on the guerrilla 
groups. If the numbers of captures, casualties, and surrenders are added, the total would be 
9,161, almost the entire membership at any one time of the guerrilla groups. The casualties 
in the armed forces were 2,354 or 25% of the number of fatalities for guerrillas. Every 
operation by the armed forces has a possibility of 65% ending in a combat engagement. 
This indicates that the armed forces is looking for the enemy and not avoiding combat. 
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5. External Aid to the guerrillas and the International Influence on the 
Conflict 
In the case of external aid for guerrilla, the changes in the international environment 
did not make at impact on these groups. The resources to maintain the struggle come from 
the internal sources in Colombia rather than external. It is clear that the Colombian 
guerrillas do not receive international aid to fight against the government and that the end of 
the Cold War does not reduce their capacity for actions. The only possibility of external aid 
for the guerrilla groups is through the internal market of weapons smuggling and that 
market is linked with the drug traffickers. The remaining issue of importance is that Cuba 
still has ideological influence on some leaders of the guerrilla groups. 
In the case of the external aid to fight the guerrilla groups, aid from the US is being 
reduced significantly. It is important to clarify that American aid is used for anti-narcotics 
purpose but the argument in this thesis is that the problem has to be a joint anti-narcotics, 
and anti-guerrilla actions. The decertification of the Colombian government is anti-drug 
effort is an unfair process by the US policy makers. These policy makers believe that the 
guerrilla is different from the narco-traffickers and there is no established link of these two 
Colombian problems. The external aid figure shows an average of US$30 million a year. 
That figure represented 0.42% of the internal Colombian defense budget. However the US 
military aid is important for the preparation of the core members of the armed forces. 
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III. PEASANT SUPPORT 
The second variable in the Wickham-Crowley theory is peasant support. Timothy 
Wickham-Crowley, holds that: 
The three measures of degree of peasant support are: How many peasants 
are willing to commit resources to the guerrilla cause? What kind of 
resources are these persons willing to commit to the guerrillas? Under what 
range of circumstances will they commit that resource?83 
This chapter will analyze the peasant support for the Colombian guerrilla groups in terms of 
open political support, regional legacies, local influence, the narco-guerrilla and cocalero 
support (peasant self-interest). Also, the dimensions and level of peasant support and the 
process of resources committed, and the different methods of guerrilla recruitment will be 
examined. 
This chapter will present theories with different views of the sources of peasant 
revolution. James Scott's view is that the peasants: 
... where they are able, they respond to such historical processes that 
threaten their "moral economy" by rebelling against their neo-capitalist land 
lords and the landlords' governmental allies84 
other authors, among them Theda Skocpol argued: 
... that peasants don't respond to a moral economy collectively shared by 
villagers. They respond rather to their own rational self-interest85 
Taking into consideration theories and analyses of the peasant support and self-interest, this 
author believes that in the Colombian case there is a mixture of both explanations. The 
explanation for that is the special background of the peasant as actors against the 
government that is responsible for the threat to their moral economy. Also, the peasant self-
interest is taking advantage of the real opportunity of increasing their income by the coca 
83 Wickham-Crowley, p. 52. 
84 Ibid, p. 92. 
85 Ibid. 
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growing under protection of the guerrilla groups. Both these forces have become a 
collective action channeled by the Marxist ideology against the state. 
The Colombian peasant must be examined with the purpose of understanding the 
real peasant support for the guerrillas. Peasants supporting the guerrillas can be categorized 
into three groups. The first group is the peasant who works in licit agrarian production or 
related activities, for the first group this study will analyze peasant support and explain the 
degree of support. The second group is the peasant who works as a colonist for many years 
and who now works in the illicit drug product as coca, poppy, and marijuana. The third 
group is not a real peasant in the historical sense whose life is at the edge of survival, 
unemployed, but is an opportunist who moves in search of easy money. This group comes 
from the cities or towns and its support for the guerrillas is more an opportunity for business 
rather then a peasant background. 
The second group of peasants, the "colonist" and the third group the "interested" 
will be referred to as the "cocalero" for identification .. The production of cocaine and how 
those people become linked with the narco-guerrilla will be addressed. 
Figures on the urban-rural population of Colombia, according to the National 
Council of Illicit Drugs, was in 1985, 69.5%-31.5% respectively.86 From the total 
population of 34,000,000 of Colombians, the number of peasants in the population would 
be 10,700,000. The number of peasants that the government considers to be "cocalero" is 
about 300,000. 
A. OPEN POLITICAL SUPPORT 
The open political support for the guerrillas using the recent election results is quite 
weak. The observation is that for both guerrilla movements the political support is not a first 
level concern. The only group that has established a bridge with political life in Colombia is 
the F ARC. That began with the PCC in the 1960s, in the words of Wickham-Crowley 
86 Gabriel de Vega, Compromiso de Colombia Frente al Problema Mundial de Ia Droga (Santa Fe de Bogota, 
Imprenta Nacional de Colombia, September 1995), p. 25. 
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The PCC arranged for many of these peasant guerrilla leaders to enter the 
upper echelons of the party. F ARC's leadership was maintained largely by 
peasant leaders thrown up in self-defense areas during the course of la 
Violencia. The PCC's influence in rural areas was, however, quite modest 
compared to that of the major parties. A number of writers have argued that 
Liberal and Conservative loyalties at the local level dominated village life 
and often approached the pathological. In such a situation-even granting 
considerable decay in those loyalties during and after La Violencia- the PCC 
did not have the kind of political ties to the bulk of the peasantry that the 
main parties had. 87 
Later the F ARC group lost its channel with the PCC as a condition for the peace 
process, and created the UP as its political wing. This is a leftist party formed in 1985 to 
participate in electoral politics. It has close ties to the Communist Party and the F ARC. 
Since its founding, the UP has had significant local electoral success. However, hundreds of 
its activists, including its presidential candidates in 1986, Jaime Pardo Leal, and in 1990, 
Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, have been murdered by right-wing paramilitary groups. In May, 
1996 F ARC created the clandestine movement "Bolivarian Movement for a new 
Colombia." 
In the case of the ELN with its long history it has only had a small participation in 
open political process. Its attempts try at open political support through a party was the 
MOEC in the mid 1960s. This action by the ELN is difficult to understand because from the 
beginning they have tried to impose the "Cuban Road" or model of revolution and that 
model requires the political support of the peasantry and people in general. Therefore the 
ELN do not believe in the importance of open political support. The only group that 
throughout Colombian political history has used the open political support to seize power 
was the M-19. But this was at a time when they were negotiating with the government in 
1990. This political event of open political support for a former guerrilla group confirms 
that civil society is not interested in a violent or a real revolution in Colombia. The peasant 
87 Ibid., p. 145. 
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follows his traditional custom of taking part in the different elections of either the Liberal or 
Conservative parties. 
The public reward for the M-19 was the electoral result in the next elections for 
president on 27, May 1990. The M-19 party won seats and a say in the congress to reform 
the 1886 constitution. According to the Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil: 
The M-19 party with 13% of the votes with a national total of 735,374, 
the Liberal party with 49% of the votes with 2,891,808, and the 
Conservative party with the 36% of the votes with 2,196,287.88 
To understand the real electoral support that Colombians gave to the parties that in 
some way represent the guerrilla groups' interest or political ideology, this section will use 
some results for president 1990-1994, and for mayors (Alcaldes) from 1988-1990 in 
comparison with the political support for the traditional parties. According to the 
Registraduria Nacional de Colombia. 
Table 10. Open Political Support 
Election Year Liberal Conservative UP* M-19* PCC* Protest 
National Level 
President 1990 2,891,808 2,169,287 754,740 186,430 
President 1994 2,725,043 2,604,771 219,214 242,277 
Senate 1990 4,470,853 2,531,316 358,246 35,274 241,456 
Senate Seats 66 39 7 2 
Regional Level 
House of Rep. 1990 4,438,654 2,511,228 26,686 281,229 254,095 
House Seats 117 65 1 8 4 
Municipal Level 
# Mayoralties 1988 453 413 16 127 
#Mayoralties 1990 495 412 11 3 1 108 
In Table 10, which shows support for the guernllas at the natiOnal level, It Is 
important to clarify what protest vote means. Protest vote is the number of votes for 
independent candidates or religious or environmental parties, also it includes other groups 
of people who do not find any candidates for the positions and use the white vote 01 oto 
blanco). The parties with UP, M-19, and PCC* are those who support the guerrilla activities 
or agree with the guerrillas' purpose of seizing power. In this table the only group to take 
88 Registradurfa Nacional Del Estado Civil, Resultados Electorales, p. 16. 
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part in presidential elections in 1990-1994 was the M-19. They received some votes as a 
political reward for the peace process. At the national level the open political support for the 
parties that represent the guerrilla and their political objectives is very small. Even in the 
case of the M-19 group until the group entered the peace process with the legal 
government. 
On the other hand the percentage of abstention in Colombia in 1990 was 56.63% of 
the total registered voters. The percentage of abstention in 1994 was 66,05% one of the 
highest in history. At the regional level, in this case the elections for senators and members 
of the house of representatives, it is not clear how many members supported the guerrillas 
politically. This is because they sometimes use other names or a coalition to get the votes to 
win a seat. The numbers of seats that support the parties that represent the political 
objectives of the guerrilla is small. 
At the local level, the municipalities, it is evident that the parties that support the 
political objectives of the guerrilla movements in the last eight years have controlled 15 
municipalities. The list of some municipalities where the mayor is elected by parties that 
support the guerrilla objectives are in 1988 through 1990, according to the Registraduria 
Nacional del Estado Civil de Colombia is as follows: 
In 1988 the following municipalities Mutata, (1,566 votes), Yond6,(1,041 
votes), Acandi, (725 votes), Bojaya, (700 votes), Nuqui, (960 votes), El 
Castillo, ( 1,558 votes), Mesetas, (1,488 votes), Leyva, (921 votes), Tame, 
(2,641 votes). In 1990 Arauquita, (3,499 votes), Puerto Triunfo, (1,121 
votes), Segovia, (1,223), San Pablo, (1,286 votes), Lejanias, (1,469 votes), 
Mesetas, (2,906 votes), Vista Hermosa, (2,059 votes), Cartagena del Chaira, 
(1,969 votes), La Montanita, (1,182 votes), Riosucio, (1,917 votes), Tame, 
(3,226 votes).89 
No single town in the list has an important social, economic, or political structure in 
comparison with the large cities. These municipalities normally are located far from the 
89 Ibid., p. 5, 11, 15, 16,107, 113, 144, 192, pp. 257-285. 
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regional or departmental cities. Therefore, there is open political support evident at the 
municipal level, but it is too weak to support a revolution. 
However, in some cases coalition political movements in the municipalities (protest 
votes) are the best way to reach real objectives. An example is the case of the mayors 
elected by the protest vote in 1988 was in 130 municipalities, and in 1990, 107 
municipalities. 
In summary, the open political support in the national, regional, and municipal level 
where the majority population is made up of peasants, the political support for guerrillas is 
very weak. This support is decreasing for the parties that support politically or ideologically 
the guerrilla groups. 
B. REGIONAL LEGACIES OF THE GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS 
In this section, the author will try to answer the three following questions: 
• Where does this particular form of political violence originate? 
• What is the concept of sons of violence in the last three generations of 
Colombians? 
• Why does violence remain in some areas of Colombia? 
The answers to these questions begin with the history of violence and civil wars in 
the 19th century. Colombia has had nine civil wars or confrontations from 1830 to 1902. 
According to F emando Gaitan: 
The civil war of the thousand days included all the country, it was high 
violent intensity, where later appeared guerrilla groups, a numerous turmoil 
in a great amount of municipalities, from that time they were called the 
liberal guerrilla, the Conservator party was the winner and the country was 
the loser. The figures to describe the death in that war were 85,000 people, 
however some authors have other estimates90 
90 Deas, "Aproximaciones a Las Teorias de La Violencia," Second Section, in Dos Ensayos Especulativos Sobre 
la Violencia in Colombia (Santa fe de Bogota, Tercer Mundo Editores, 1995), p. 200. 
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Some regions after those civil wars of the 19th century became known as violent 
regions, among them Antioquia, Santander South and North, Cundinamarca, Boyaca, 
Tolima, Huila, Cauca, Quindio, Caldas. At that time those regions were··the most important 
economic, political, and social places in the country. 
In the 20th Century the defining event was the 1940-1960 period known as La 
Violencia. According to Jonathan Hartlyn: 
The individual-level economic interest across all social groups and 
political sectarianism began to reinforce each other, polarizing the country in 
the opposing figures of Gomez for the conservatives and Gaitan for the 
Liberals.91 
During this period the two most important events were the Bogotazo in 1948 and the Coup 
d'etat in 1953. Again the areas where the level of political violence and guerrillas influence 
and activities were raised, the following according to Timothy Wickham-Crowley The 
department with substantial guerrilla activity are listed as follows in the approximate order 
of the movement's strength and located, Tolima, Huila, Santander, Caldas, Valle, Antioquia, 
Cordoba, and Department with only localized, fragmentary guerrilla influence, Bolivar, 
Boyaca, Cauca, Cundinamarca, Meta.92 
From that period of Violencia began an agrarian mobilization produced by the 
political violence and the effect of peasant exodus of liberal and conservative guerrillas. 
According to Malcolm Deas: 
... the different exodus of the guerrilla groups from the scene is the comer 
stone to maintain the unity and the spirit of struggle, and also the beginning 
of the concept of a defensive guerrilla during the years and maybe until 
now3 
In the coffee production regions, those issues produced a colonization process. According to 
Alfredo Molano: 
91 Jonathan Hartlyn, The Politics of Coalition Rule in Colombia (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 37. :\ 
92 Wickham-Crowley, p. 108. 
93 Deas, First Section, p. 72. 
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By the 1950, Colonization was linked to other factors among them the 
crisis of the peasant economy, demographic growth, and political violence.94 
This concept of colonization caused political violence and the ·Crisis economy and 
with it appeared the "Independent Republics" in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These were 
regions such as: 
• In Cundinamarca, Sumapaz and Tequendama, in Tolima, Marquetalia Davis, 
and Villarrica, in Meta, La Uribe, La Ucrania 
• In Huila, El Pato and Guayabero, Riochiquito, in the low Guayabero, the 
Caguan in Caqueta lands. 
• In the middle Magdalena River Valley, Perija Mountains, the Sierra Nevada de 
Santa Marta, and Uraba in the north of Antioquia 
• In the lower part of the Cauca Valley River and also the large part of the 
piedmont of the eastern plains, now the regions of Arauca, Guaviare, Meta, 
Casanare. 
• Some of "Independent Republics" are completely unknown in the political life 
of Colombia. 
The F ARC learned from this colonization program that the control of a large 
territorial area was the key to their armed uprising. They have designed and are currently 
developing what they call "the Revolutionary Agrarian Reformation." This agrarian 
program was launched on July 20th, 1964, and consists of the expropriations by means of 
invasion and kidnapping, banishment, or assassination of the landowners. 
The guerrillas have found in the colonization in which they were active that they are 
the peripheral local power. Later the colonist become ruined because the poor market 
conditions, communications roads and the absence of the local, regional, and national 
government's aid. Most of the guerrilla leaders of the F ARC come from this period. Their 
relatives and friends became the bosses for that organization. There is a hatred and 
94 Alfredo Molano, "Violence and Colonization," in Violence in Colombia, eds. Charles Bergquist, Ricardo 
Peiiaranda, 1992, p. 197. 
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resentment from that time of two to three generations against the state and the government. 
This group wishes to maintain the armed struggle in Colombia. 
Recently, in the late 1980s, the links between the guerrilla and;the land colonizers 
has become an important factor in the development of highly complex marriages among 
those persons without any real economical opportunity and the necessity of the guerrilla 
groups to finance their war. 
The answer to the regional legacy question of the guerrillas and the political 
violence in Colombia must deal with the location of the guerrillas groups and the areas of 
guerrilla activity. The groups' influence is in some cases the same as that in the war of the 
thousand days. For example, Antioquia, Santander, Tolima, Huila, Cauca, Boyaca, 
Cundinamarca and other cases are related to the high level of violence during the period of 
the 1940s, and 1960's. Another example is Tolima, Huila, Meta, Cauca, Antioquia, 
Santander, Cordoba, Bolivar, and Quindio. Some new area where the violence has increased 
are Uraba, Guaviare, Meta,' Casanare, Caqueta, Cesar, Cauca, south Tolima, East 
Cundinamarca, and middle Magdalena. This is the result of colonizers in the 1950s and 
1960s and the exodus of people from the former independent republics. These people are 
now in places where the guerrillas have increased their financing system with the narco-
trafficking. 
C. LOCAL INFLUENCE 
The concept of influence refers to some kitid of pressure on the rural and urban 
population or on the local authorities. The term presence refers to some kind of operation 
that the guerrilla groups have developed for a specific target. Later this concept will enable 
an understanding of the local influences that the guerrillas have won back in the last decade. 
It is very important to make clear that in Colombia rural society is composed mainly of 
peasants who have some land or jobs outside of a town. Most local police groups have only 
a few policemen without any efficient support and are being asked to stop groups of 30 to 
40 insurgents. The guerrilla can easily overwhelm the national police, and only the army 
71 
has the military capacity to neutralize a serious attack. But the army has to control large 
areas with less then the number of troops required. 
It is necessary to formulate a definition of the terms guerrilla influence. Guerrilla 
influence means to have influence, or to have great weight over the decision makers in a 
limited region, or to have an influence on the persons and behavior in a given territory. It 
also means the power to check, to audit, to control by force or intimidation the conduct or 
decision of a given area or municipality. 95 The guerrilla groups do this through extortion, 
kidnapping, assaults and budget divergence; by threatening or even by an announcement of 
something against the authorities or persons. 
The term guerrilla presence means to show, to display, to be present, actual and in 
person. This is a tactic of the guerrillas to give the impression of power, mobility and 
capacity to control. Normally they use the edge of the three main chains of mountains to 
move either through the flat country or through the valleys of the large rivers. 
The following is a comment about the local control from the Revista de Criminalidad: 
Both groups the F ARC and the ELN had been developing the goals about 
the strength of the local control. In January we know that the CGSM 
harassed 225 municipalities in 1994.96 
Another source listed over 400 municipalities that have some level of influence or 
presence by the guerrilla groups. 
The following information comes from Table 7 of guerrilla activities. This table is 
organized by departments and the data on actions of the guerrilla groups during a year 
period in 1994. This information established some measure for guerrilla presence or 
influence. Colombia has more than one thousand municipalities, unfortunately the data does 
not have the actions by municipalities. However, it shows the level of influence, presence, 
actions by the guerrilla groups. It is necessary to create a scale to measure the real influence 
95 Edwin Williams, The Williams Spanish & English Dictionary (Mexico, Fuentes Impresores SA, 1985), p. 477, 
156,340. 
96 Colombian National Police, Revistade Criminalidad 1994, p. 50, 53, 55, 61, 141, 149, 165. 
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over the different regions. The elements will be the number of guerrilla fronts both rural and 
urban, the number of extortions, the kidnappings, the assaults on the populations, the 
terrorist actions and in some measure the narco-trafficking activities; also included are the 
guerrilla's location. Those events have a strong relationship and suggest a scale of level of 
control, influence or presence: 
• Low level presence and influence: The guerrilla actions are casual and their 
actions against the population or the government forces do not have the 
collaboration of the peasants of the region. 
• Medium level of presence and influence: The population does not collaborate 
with the guerrilla groups, at least the tactic of a threat to the population is the 
key to maintain the equilibrium by the guerrilla. The local economy is weak but 
has some sources of employment and the local infrastructure shows the 
efficiency of the local regional and national government. 
• High presence and influence: The main activities of the municipality are in 
control of the guerrilla group. This situation is found in regions where the 
government is absent and narco-trafficking is the only way to survive. However, 
in some cases the region is rich and the government is present, and the local 
economy is strong. 
Figure 4 shows a strong relationship between the number of fronts of both guerrilla 
groups F ARC and ELN, the number of terrorist acts. The first line shows the number of 
ELN Cuadrillas for each department, the second line is the number ofF ARC fronts in each 
department, the third line is the number of terrorist acts in that department. In Chapter III 
this data will be used to show the level of guerrilla influence, and the level of peasant 
support for the guerrilla groups. 
Table 7 (Chapter II, page 39) shows the activities of the guerrilla groups in 1994. 
Using this table and the scale presented above the levels of presence or influence of 
guerrillas groups can be determined: 
• Departments with a high probability of local influence or presence in their 
municipalities or regions are: Antioquia; Santander, North Santander, Meta, 
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Figure 4. Graphic Relationship Guerrilla Groups-Terrorist Acts- Departments 
• Departments with a medium probability of local influence or presence in their 
municipalities or regions are: Atlantico, Bolivar, Boyaca, Caldas, Casanare, 
Cauca, Choc6, Cordoba, Magdalena, Narifio, Quindiio, Sucre, Vichada. The 
following departments must be move to the high level of influence but the 
amount of population and the data analyzed suggest the medium level: 
Guaviare, Putumayo, Arauca, Uraba. 
• Departments with low probability of local influence or presence in their 
municipalities or regions are: Amazonas, Vaupes, San Andres, Risaralda, 
Guania, Guajira. 
Some departments can move from one level to another. This depends on the 
analysis that is used. In this case, the correlation among the variables of this table presented 
in Chapter II shows a relationship among the variables. It is important to clarify the effect 
on this analysis of those regions where the population is low and also the lack of available 
and high quality data. (See maps in Appendix) 
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D. PEASANT SUPPORT AND SELF-INTEREST 
1. The Narco-guerrilla Concept 
The explanation about how the Guaviare and Guayabero become Coca zones has to 
deal with the colonization process after the so called "Independent Republics" as Alfredo 
Molano explained in the following way: 
Here the links forged since the 1950s between land colonization and 
guerrillas took especial and particularly violent form in 1970s and 1980s 
under the influence of the cocaine trade. These regions were colonized by 
peasants who fled from the violence. Most of these colonists had lost their 
land and belongings and escaped with only their lives. A few, very few, had 
been organized by the two marching column, the first column of El Duda 
spread-out and, loosely organized settled in the piedmont of the eastern 
plains between La Uribe and Medellin Del Ariari, as well as in the middle 
courses of the Ariary, Guape, Guejar rivers. The second column originally 
headed toward the alto Guayabero and then spread out toward El Pato and 
Cagmin and eventually toward the Caquetit river.97 
In the early 1980s the F ARC group maintained control over the producers by 
applying rules to the peasant and the commercialization. For the colonist this conduct was 
known for years. Those groups held authority and regulated the commerce of their 
monopoly with force and their special system of dispensing justice. This was especially in 
regions where the presence of the government was too weak or too slow. Producers paid 10 
percent and merchants paid eight percent for this service. These fees were in addition to 
those that the guerrilla maintained in their areas of influence. 
The boom of the illicit crops brought with it confusion and disorder in all aspects of 
peasant society. Social, economic, political, and structural changes in the production 
relations, markets, justice system, and the cultural role of the former communities were 
effected. It added prostitution, unemployment, arms smuggling, and low respect for 
authority. It also resulted in loss of the land they had been receiving from agrarian 
organizations. According to Bruce Bagley: 
97 Molano, p. 208. 
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_ ... a rarely considered implication of the drug boom in Colombia is it 
impacted on peasant movements, particularly on an organization called 
ANUC (National Association of Peasant Beneficiaries). This organization, 
which became radical in the early 1970s as a result of the conservative 
government's decision under the Pastrana administration to end the agrarian 
reform, has had the ground cut out from under it by the drug trade. This 
occurred precisely as the peasant organization was demanding agrarian 
reform throughout the 1960s and into the early 1970s, when the Colombian 
drug began. The drug boom, with its high wages and ability to generate 
employment, has provided a kind of escape valve for the Colombian 
peasantry which has reduced the levels of peasant organization.98 
According to Gabriel Marcella: 
.. .It is important to consider the market logic from a peasant's 
perspective, coca often brings ten times the price of competing crops. It is 
hardy deep rooted woody bush which produce alkaloid-bearing leaves three 
or four times a year for 10' to 15 years99 The peasant self interest and the 
cocalero according to the national council of Illicit Drugs has a good 
business. From every one hectare of coca it produces 2,500 pounds of coca 
leaves each 100 days. With this amount it is possible to produce 4,4 pounds 
of Coca row, the production a year is three to four times, the price for 13,2 
pounds of coca row is approximately in Colombia US$10,048 (each pound 
US$ 382). Later this product in Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami, New York. 
Later the same pound (US$382) will cost between US$5,000-US$20,000 
dollars. In Europe the same pound cost will be between US$10,000 and 
US$45,000 dollars.100 
The current situation explains this relationship between the guerrillas and narco-
trafficking and the recent changes to law in Colombia. Special Act #0717 from the 
Colombian government, April, 1996, deals with special public order zones. This decree has 
an important implication for the departments where the growing of coca has developed as 
an industry. The local markets of precursors or chemical products are maintained by the 
pressure of illicit drugs. The departments in this situation are Meta, Vichada, Guaviare, 
98 Bagley, p. 97. 
99 Gabriel Marcella, Warriors in Peace Time (IlFOR, England, Frank Cass, 1994), p. 77. 
100 De Vega, pp. 31-34. 
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Vaupes, Caqueta, Putumayo. (same guerrilla-colonize zones in the 1950s-1960s) Among 
the effects of the measure considered to be important are the following: 101 
• Limitations to the trade and sale of cement, petroleum, gasoline, and chemical 
precursors. Normally these are used as chemical precursors for illicit drugs. 
• Control of peasant movements by the military commander. 
• Control of the different means of transport. 
• Martial Law from 18:00 to 06:00. No one can move at that time. 
• The operational control will be by the army officer in charge of the operation, 
not the civil authority. 
According to the newspaper El Tiempo one result of this measure: 
... was that the consumption of gasoline in a place where the cars are few 
in number is minimum and was of 19,000 gallons by day, and tons of 
cement where all the houses are constructed with lumber, everything was a 
precursor and being consumed to produce cocaine102 • 
The armed forces began with Operation Conquer II in April 1996, aimed at getting 
control of zones known for coca-poppy production, most of them in the southern part of 
Colombia. In Caqueta a few days after the application of the law, the first manifestation was 
the assassination of the governor of Caqueta department by the XV front of the F ARC on 
16 June 1996. After the application of the special law the narco guerrilla theory took on 
more credibility. The law along with the "Cocalero"103 operation confirmed the existence of 
this sinister linkage. A strike began in July 1996. This strike had an important characteristic. 
For the first time the guerrilla groups of the F ARC and 32nd front and 42nd and 48th 
fronts in Putumayo, and 15th, 14th, 49th, 3rd fronts in Caqueta, and the first front, 44th 
front and the JJR company and RM company took an open part in the strikes and pushed 
101 "Para El Orden Publico," El Tiempo, May 19, 1995, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
102 "Primeras Medidas Especiales en Miraflores," El Tiempo, May 16, 1995, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet 
103 The "Cocalero" refers to the peasants who grow and produce cocaine in the south of Colombia. 
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the people to demand that the government stop the eradication programs, and change the 
legislation. 
Another important consequence of the peasant protest was the step back in the 
relation of the Judicial system and the armed forces, especially with the case of the judicial 
order that stopped the most important operation against the producers of cocaine and poppy. 
The Armed Forces was trying to block 50,000 peasants (cocaleros) that were going to the 
main city of Florencia a southern department. A judge of the region used a judicial tool104 
"La tutela" to protect (tutelar) the civil right of movement of the peasants. Then the 
Commander of the armed forces and The commander of the army said that would not abide 
by that judicial order. 
The peasant strike presented a dangerous balance of other consequences according 
to the newspaper El Tiempo: 
... of this strike after 26 days of protest against the measure of the 
government and the eradication and fumigation programs the result were: 
seven people dead, 72 wounded, a loss ofUS$55 million.105 
There were consequences for the guerrillas as well. The guerrillas lost money with 
these measures and it weakened their financing system. With this protest they wanted to 
show support for the peasants and paint the state and armed forces as a common enemy. 
The purpose was to increase their own support in the same way that violence's offspring 
had been accustomed to in the last 40 years. It is important to show the level of protest in 
Colombia during 1996 against the eradication of illicit crops. The true dimension of the 
conflict and the importance of the protest is that cocalero support is the most important 
issue to the F ARC in their engine for armed struggle. The cycle of protest began in Caqueta 
in the south and lasted 45 days. The protest was made up of 55,000 peasants. The peasants 
were asking to stop the eradication program. They were also asking for US$2,500 dollars on 
the average per hectare for coca leaves that the government wished to cut. 
1 04 "La Agenda Verde, " Semana, September 2, 1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
105 Antonio Caballero, "La ineptitud," Semana, August 25, 1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
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In the department of Bolivar the protest was for a duration of 15 days, made up of 
4,000 peasants. This protest was again to stop the eradication program. There were also 
protests in the departments of Guaviare, Putumayo, and Cauca. 
An analysis of this situation of the peasant protest against the eradication program 
shows the degree of peasant support for the guerrillas. But this support is given for the 
particular circumstance of the growing of illicit crop for cocalero benefits. Peasant self 
interest in this case is the relationship with the guerrillas. There is some support for 
protection, for judicial conditions, and narco traffickers. 
The agreement between the government and the cocalero was to stop the eradication 
program and for the government to buy a hectare of coca at US$2,300 with to many 
implications to the law enforcement in this field. 
2. Coca-guerrilla Areas 
The location of coca-guerrilla areas is the result of important factors in history of 
these departments in the late 19th and early 20th century. Beginning with the politically 
j 
violent conflict among the Colombians, these departments were the former independent 
republics of the 1950s and 1960s. Guerrillas move there to fmd an easier place to defend 
against the government as in these areas the government presence is limited by resources 
budget, and the efficiency of the state's bureaucracy. 
Drugs): 
According to the Consejo Nacional de Estupefacientes, (National Council on Illicit 
The available statistics show that Colombia has 40,000 hectares of coca 
areas, and 20,000 hectares of poppy growing areas, and 9,000 hectares of 
marihuana growing areas106 
In the case of the FARC's fronts the locations that coincide with the coca production107 are: 
Caqueta, Guaviare, Meta, Tolima, Huila, Cauca, Narifio, Putumayo). In the case of the 
ELN's cuadrillas the locations that coincide with the coca-production are: Bolivar, North 
106 De Vega, p. 28. 
107 Ejercito Nacional, Presentation to the Anti-Drugs Commission of the U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C. 
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part of Antioquia, Arauca, North part of Cauca, North part of Narifio and North 
Santander.108 
According to Luis Villamarin: 
.. .in the same way that the guerrilla influence in 1985 was 62% of the 
municipalities called "of colonization" and 44% municipalities of 
colonization of "border or frontier", today is growing to 93% to the 
municipalities "of colonization" and 79% to the colonization of "frontier or 
border"109 
3. Methods of Recruitment 
The guerrilla recruitment had four stages with a close relationship to the 
development of the Colombian conflict. The first stage of recruitment was from the 
guerrilla liberal and conservative period of the early 1950s. The second stage was from the 
effects of the colonization by the offspring of the violence in the early 1960s. The third 
stage was the ideological or romantic stage from universities students and professors, and 
messianic guerrillas with the unworkable plans for of seizing power. The last stage is the 
narco-guerrilla effect where different social levels do business with each other. 
Clandestinely growing or producing coca and poppy has created an illegal way of living, 
and the most secure way to insure this living is to join the guerrillas. 
This section will take into consideration the recruitment in the narco-guerrilla stage. 
According to Semana: 
In 1996 there were 89 young guerrilla members captured or turned into 
the ICBF; 2,000 boys and girls ages 13-15 years had taken part in guerrilla 
actions, and 23 guerrilla-boys gave themselves up to the authorities and have 
become part of this investigation110 
According to Malcolm Deas: 
108 De Vega, pp. 103-105. 
109 Villamarin, p. 145. 
110 "Soldaditos de Plomo," Semana, , May 1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
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.... the recruitment of some of those guerrilla groups is highly organized 
through militias of support, the guerrilla rank-and file is very young, and 
sometimes they are paid the first month and become part oftherevolution111 
According to El Tiempo: 
... most of guerrilla boys come to the groups voluntary, but others come 
by force or for the money that is offered, then they receive a few things 
needed to survive112 
Most of the recruitment is from people that have some relations with coca 
production or cocaleros, that need another job for survival. 
E. LEVEL OF PEASANT SUPPORT 
To understand the peasant support for the guerrilla groups in Colombia it is 
necessary to consider the above description of the Colombian peasant and the development 
of political violence in Colombia over a 90 year period. The following will use the three 
kinds of peasants in Colombia to form an analysis of peasant support. 
First is the peasant who lives under the law. The analysis of peasant support will 
explain the degree of support that they give to the guerrilla groups. This is the peasant who 
follows the legal way to produce and grow crops and who has a social and cultural 
background with the land. For example, a producer of coffee, potatoes, com, and other 
kinds of products. This type of peasant, in the real sense, does not support the guerrilla 
activity. He is in fact another victim of the guerrillas. 
The second and third kind of peasant is the colonist and the peasant (Nomad) or 
"cocalero". This is a mixture of people who come from the cities or towns, and also from 
the colonist areas. For this group the production of cocaine is a business opportunity. This is 
how those people become linked with the narco-guerrilla concept rather than their peasant 
111 Deas, p. 75. 
112 '·"Salario, Salud, Sexo," El Tiempo, May 27, 1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
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background. Nonnally a colonist is a peasant who has worked his life and now has nothing. 
Their relation with the state is distant and they do not believe in the central government. 
Using the explanation above and the scale developed by Timothy Wickham-
Crowley to measure the peasant support, this section will present a hypothetical analysis of 
guerrilla support in Colombia. Timothy Wickham-Crowley proposed a scale from the 
lowest degree to the highest degree of support using the definition in the following table: 
1. Non-reporting of the guerrilla presence to the authorities. 
2. Offering food and another service to the guerrillas. 
3. Offering to serve as guides, lookouts, or errand runners for the guerrillas. 
4. Offering shelter to the guerrillas. 
5. Offering organizational cooperation with guerrillas at the village level, including making 
of weaponry, participation in schools and civil defense, etc. 
6. Offering occasional armed service to the guerrillas (militia service). 
7. Abandoning one's field and work to become a full-time combatant in the guerrilla unit 113 
To understand this scale It IS necessary to review the Issues presented m this chapter. 
• Regional guerrilla's legacy 
• Peasant self-interest or cocalero support 
• Local influence by guerrilla groups 
These issues are related to the level of peasant support. By reviewing this issue it is 
possible to approximate the level of peasant support for the guerrilla groups in Colombia in 
the recent years. 
Using the Wickham-Crowley scale, the letter A represents passive support to the 
guerrillas and the letter G represents active participation in guerrilla activity. 
The following Figure shows the relationship between the peasant origin (type of 
peasant) and the local influence or presence of the guerrilla groups. 



















Figure 5. Level of Peasant Support 
The explanation of Figure 5 is as follows; the level of peasant support depends on 
the level of guerrilla influence and the peasant's origin. The probability of a high level of 
support is determined by the peasant origin or status. If the origin of the peasant is Cocalero 
then the likelihood is that the level of support is active (7) or high. If the origin is peasant, 
regardless of the level of influence, then the level of support is (1) or passive or limited. If 
the peasant origin is colonist, the peasant support will depend up on the level of influence of 
the guerrillas groups. 
This model could be used as an approach for further research of peasant support for 
the guerrilla groups in Colombia. The model would require the collection of data in a study 
or multiple examples in different parts of the country. 
F. SUMMARY 
In Colombia, the concept of the origin of peasant rebellions is a mixture of theories 
of Theda Skocpol and James Scott. The Colombian case is a mixture in the sense that 
peasants have responded to the historical processes that threaten their moral economy, by 
rebelling against their landlords and the government. At the same time some of them are 
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responding to their peasant self-interest because they do not believe in the concept of a 
moral economy collectively. 
1. Open Political Support 
The open political support for the guerrilla groups is weak at the national level. At 
the regional level there is a small representation. However at the municipal level the groups 
have some influence. The coalition system has become another political option at the 
municipal level. From a total of 1000 municipalities the groups have open political support 
in 17. In a coalition system as a protest vote, support is strong in 107 municipalities. 
2. Legacies of Violence 
Do the people carry their rebellions with them? The Colombian case provides strong 
evidence that the members of the two guerrilla groups' have a background of violence and 
that they work in the same areas because they know that the likelihood of support is also 
high. 
Consider that in some places the level of violence in the 19th century was higher, 
than in the middle of the 20th century (1950s, 1960s). Also, that these same places that had 
high levels of political violence are where the liberal guerrillas developed their activities. 
The areas of colonization in the 1950s, 1960s and the exodus of people from the 
independent republics, are where the guerrillas groups now maintain a high influence or 
presence. New areas with high levels of violence are related to narco-trafficking and the 
guerrillas. 
3. Guerrillas' Local Influence 
For both guerrilla groups one of the most important objectives and tasks is the 
consolidation of some level of local influence at the municipal level. They have shown a 
presence in almost 400 municipalities and in more than 30 departments throughout the 
country. 
From the table of guerrilla activities, in 1994 ( p39) we can establish a level of 
influence as being high, medium, and low. This is done by taking into consideration the 
number of guerrilla groups, and their criminal activities. 
84 
4. Peasant Self-interest or Cocalero Support 
Peasant support in Colombia must be divided into three categories: the typical 
peasant, the colonist, and the cocalero. With a recent Colombian anny operation called 
"Conquest" in the south part of the country a clear link was established between the 
guerrillas and the production and protection of coca. As a result of the operation, the 
guerrilla group pressured the peasant, colonist and cocalero to protest against the central 
government and the Army. This protest was of the coca eradication program. The number 
of peasant cocaleros mobilized in this protest in different zones of the country was close to 
200,000 persons. The protesters' objective was to stop the eradication program, a demand 
for better living conditions and large projects by the government in these areas as a 
condition for reducing the growing of coca products. 
Another condition of the protesters was the reimbursement of US$2500 for each 
hectare that the government had eradicated. An important factor to note was the close 
relationship between the coca zones and the guerrilla areas. Today 93% of the 
municipalities with coca production has a guerrilla presence. 
The guerrilla groups have changed their recruitment methods in the recent years. An 
example of this is the cocalero that begins to work with the coca production, later he 
becomes a member of the guerrillas. He joins the guerrillas for two reasons: First, for 
protection and as a condition to stay in business. More then 40% of the guerrilla members 
are young but the leadership is held by older guerrilla members. Second the market logic 
from a peasant's perspective is that coca often brings ten times the price of competing crops. 
5. Levels of Peasant Support 
In the Colombian case the level of peasant support has direct relationship with two 
variables, the origin of the peasant (peasant, colonist, cocalero ), and the level of influence of 
the guerrilla groups. 
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IV. TilE STATE WEAKNESS AND THE EMERGENCE OF DUAL POWER 
This chapter will address the weakness of the state and the .. , emergence of dual 
power. This variable of the theory established by Timothy Wickham-Crowley concerns the 
success and failure of the guerrilla revolutionary movements in Latin America. Military 
strength and peasant support are not enough to ensure a successful revolution. A situation of 
multiple sovereignty or dual power114 must exist, and the passive members of the society 
must transfer their consent :from the incumbent to the new "govemments."115 Wickham-
Crowley combines Skocpol's theory that a regime's weakness are responsible for 
revolutions, with Tilly's theory that revolutionary movements are responsible for 
revolutions. Wickham-Crowley does this by asserting that a regime's weakness allows 
revolutionary movements to emerge. Therefore the revolutionary movements may produce 
a state of multiple sovereignty which contributes to the revolutionary's success. With the 
purpose to define, and present the weakness of the Colombian state, the following is a 
discussion of some issues in the politics and society of Colombia. 
Before beginning the sections of this chapter, it is necessary to consider Timothy 
Wickham-Crowleys '- statement: 
Powerful revolutionary movements did indeed "make" revolutions in 
Cuba and Nicaragua, but only because they faced regimes that exhibited 
structural weaknesses in the face of an increasingly national opposition.116 
Wickham-Crowley used in his theory the analysis of the patrimonial praetorian 
regime or mafiacracy to analyze the weakness of the state in Cuba under Batista, and 
Nicaragua under Somoza. In Colombia, the last dictatorship was General Rojas Pinilla from 
1953-1957. In this section of consolidation of democracy in Colombia, it is necessary to 
review the political history of the last few years. The nature of the military regime in 
114 The emergency of a parallel way of authority was called "dual Power" by Trosky. 
115 This kind of new government is represented in the Colombian case by the guerrillas strategic plans. Normally, 
they call this "new Colombia" that they are trying to "build" from the ashes of the current society. 
116 Wickham-Crowley, p. 7. 
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Colombia from 1953-1957 was that it was an authoritarian regime but with some level of 
pluralism in its decisions and policies. 
One author's, Jonathan Hartlyn, opinion about the Colombian state is as follow: 
Historically the Colombian state has been weak state, although during the 
past few decades state autonomy and capacity have increased unevenly, and 
the intended and unintended consequences of different administrations' 
efforts in this direction are important.117 
According to another scholar Bruce Bagley: 
It is important to point out that Colombia probably has a stronger state, a 
state more capable of penetrating into a variety of key areas of the country 
(although not the more remote areas), than does Bolivia. The Colombian 
Government has been able to use selective repression against peasant 
organizations in zones where there have been some traces of the drug trade 
in order to control them, and if unable to co-opt them, then to repress 
them. 118 
The third variable is the weakness of the state and dual power. Wickham-Crowley 
established a measure to this particular variable in term of middle and upper classes, 
political parties, consolidation of democracy, (the patrimonial praetorian regime), mass 
media effect, the possible mass revolutionary, and the international Influence. 
A. THE UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASSES IN POLITICS 
In Colombia the upper class was composed of 24 families in the 1950s and 1960s. 
As a modem third world country Colombia has more than 1,000 powerful families that 
represent the top leaders in all the economic entrepreneurs and politicians. With the strength 
of the Colombian economy in the last 20 years (about 3-5% of economic growth), the upper 
class has expanded along with the middle class. However, the middle class remains weak, 
but bigger than 20 years ago. 
The explanation of the relationship between national politics and the middle class is 
supported by the level of consolidation of democracy and decentralization of the central 
117 Hartlyn, p. 7. 
118 Bagley, p. 97. 
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government that was responsible for everything. After 10 years of planning decentralization 
and regionalization of the state administration and with regional and local election of the 
leaders. The central government is still held responsible for all the-;regional problems; 
indeed even for the local administration of faraway towns. 
According to Timothy Wickham-Crowley: 
Colombia's middle class did have a hard entrepreneurial core in Caldas 
and Antioquia (Valle, Cundinamarca, Santander, and others). On the other 
hand, the bulk of the bureaucratic and professional middle class was 
composed of downwardly mobile cadet sons of the Colombian upper class, 
whose intellectual and political sights were still set firmly on the social 
world. Hence their sense of class identity was set firmly by that experience 
of sliding. Politically, Colombia's middle class, like all other social classes 
had been vertically integrated into one of Colombia's dominant political 
parties, the liberal and the conservative119 
In Colombia the upper and middle classes have made the parties stronger political 
institutions, then mass electoral democracies. Those factors produced weak support for 
insurgency. In the last 15 years the real support for the insurgency was presented in remote 
areas, not in the major cities. According to Catherine LeGrand 
11 Both parties were members of the upper-middle class sectors. The 
urban and rural masses become identified with both of the parties also but 
only exceptionally in leadership roles and in most cases presumably in a 
dependent/ clientelist relationship. 11120 
B. POLITICAL PARTIES 
The political parties in Colombia can be thought of in colors, blue (Conservatives) 
and red (Liberals). Not many years ago in Colombia, people on election day would dress 
according to the their party. Indeed some times the same comrades could be asked to dress 
119 Wickham-Crowley, p. 162. 
120 Catherine Legrand, "Agrarian Antecedents of the Violence," in Violencia in Colombia, p. 24. 
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contrary to the color of their party. However it is important to discuss the origin of the 
parties. 
The origin of Colombian political parties was, according to Jonathan Hartlyn: 
.. .ideological differences between the two parties were more significant 
in the nineteenth century than in the twentieth. In general, the conservatives 
were wedded to a view that approximated the previous colonial order, 
emphasizing close cooperation between the church and the state, a strong 
central administration and protectionism. The Liberals, more influenced by 
the industrial, liberal-democratic powers of the nineteenth century, generally 
argued for federalism, separation of church and state and free-trade 
economic policies. These ideological differences blended with and at times 
were superseded by more purely personalistic and regional disputes. 
Although the parties in the nineteenth century were essentially factional 
divisions within the small ruling oligarchy, the lower classes were drawn 
into the intermittent violent conflicts between them, especially in rural areas. 
Both parties were heterogeneous in terms of their regional bases and the 
socioeconomic origin of their adherents. 121 
The role of the Church has been significant in the origin of the political parties 
according to Jonathan Hartlyn: 
... the role of the Church in all areas of national life was entrenched by 
the signing of a Concordat with the Vatican in 1887, in addition, by the 
1890s, the parties had established more formal structures, with party 
directories and party conventions.122 
One of the characteristics of the Colombian political parties is the elite agreement of 
1957, which has led the country to a process of consolidation of democracy for almost 40 
years. The definition of elite according with Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John 
Higley: 
We define Elite as persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic 
positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes 
regularly and substantially. Elite are the principal decision makers. 123 
121 Hartlyn, p. 19. 
122 Ibid., p. 25. 
123 Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America 
and Southern Europe (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 8. 
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Once the dictator in 1953 began to reform the political life, the leaders of the liberal 
and conservative parties began to think of how to return democracy to the country, if an 
opportunity should appear. The transition was started by two actors the elite of the liberal 
and conservative parties, and the military junta of 1957. From this starts the process of 
consolidation, the National Front and the beginnings of the guerrillas in Colombia. 
That elite settlement has brought stability and survival for the democracy over a 
long period of time. However, the consensus was limited and rules that were established for 
the political game were narrow. The democratic institutions did not operate efficiently. 
Another result of this elite settlement, in the sense of the consensus, was the term of 
consociational democracy. The cooperation between the parties with the years of rule 
became extreme. 
According to Alexander Wilde: 
... the consociational character of Colombian democracy was clearly 
oligarchic. It assumed the continuing control of mass mobilization by 
traditional party elite. Convivencia was primarily a matter of agreement 
between national fractional leaders and depended to a great degree on 
personal relationships among them. 124 
This situation has come to the point were party factions some times change their 
name to a family name. Some examples are Lopez, (Lopismo ), Pastrana, (Pastranismo ), 
Rojas, (Rojismo) Laureano Gomez, (Laureanismo ), and in the recent years, Turbay 
(Turbayismo), and Samper, (Samperismo). This has made the concept of a party unclear 
and created parties without a ideology as demonstrated by their political programs. The 
name for this kind of phenomenon could be Caudillismo. 
Before using the term consociational democracy, it should be pointed out that the 
Colombian case of consociational democracy is a reality. The most important 
characteristics of this kind of democracy according to Lijphart cited by Vincent Maphai are 
four: 
124 Alexander Wilde, "Conversations Among Gentlemen's," in Breakdown of Democratic Regimes in Latin 
America (Baltimore, Maryland, John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 34. 
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... sharing of executive power by all significant groups (government by 
grand coalition); such groups' retention of a high degree of cultural and 
regional autonomy; proportionality in the distribution of civil-service 
positions, public funds, and legislative seats ... ; and a minority veto on most 
vital issues.125 
The evidence for this was Article 120 of the 1886 Colombian National Constitution, 
dating from the National Front, according to Jorge Osterling: 
This article ruled that the governing party must name members of the 
other major party to senior government positions126 
This rule was in effect until the reform of 1991. However, appointments to position were 
still made by consensus among the leaders of the second party in the last election. 
Both political parties have had some problems that have limited their credibility. 
Politicians have become individualist, creating their own parties with a considerable amount 
of factionalism. Therefore the parties do not have serious governing programs or structured 
ideologies. Both are more interested in being elected to gain access to public resources. 
Colombian political movements tend to organize themselves around strong leaders. 
The leaders themselves tend to gravitate toward the base of power held by the two 
traditional parties. According to Juan Roman: 
Early on, the Colombian parties were dominated by a close circle of 
professional politicians from the upper and middle classes. They were 
territorially decentralized, with departments as the basic electoral units, and 
decision making performed by the national congressmen. Even if the 
members of a party were in alignment with one leader, it did not indicate the 
presence of an oligarchic structure for decision making; the relationship was 
more of a reciprocal one. The center of historical partisan activity was in the 
congress. Due to the lack of organizational strength, the congressmen have 
depended significantly on their electoral machinery for reelection. The basic 
resource for bargaining has been governmental patronage in the form of 
bureaucratic employment and dispensation of funds. 127 
125 Vincent Maphai, "A Season For Power -Sharing," Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, No. I, January 1996, p. 67. 
126 Osterling, p. 107. 
127 Juan Roman, "Guerrilla Violence in Colombia: Examining Causes and Consequences," Master's Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 1994, p. 43. 
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In other words, the factor of bossism (Caciquismo Y28 that has until recently played an 
important role in electoral decisions of some regions. Another method is patronage for a 
bureaucratic position (Clientelismo ). 
Taking in consideration Dahl's scale to see the democracy, the concept of 
institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of 
preference. An example of this is a change or revocatory mandate in the Senate and House 
of Representatives with the plebiscite (Constituent) in 1991. The plebiscite was for the 
purpose of electing representatives to reform the Colombian Constitution of 1886. Before 
this time no one could claim legitimacy for congressmen, and indeed this is the issue that 
led to these important changes in the legislative bodies. Due to the multiple problems of 
political corruption among the congressmen in different ways during the last four decades. 
The main changes in the legislative bodies according to Professor Rodrigo Losada: 
From the total senators elected in 1990 (113 members), only 30 members 
remain today in their chairs, two of them went down to the House of 
representatives and 81 are out of the body, From the total representatives 
elected in 1990-(119 members), only five members remain in the chairs, 50 
members went up to the Senate and 144 went out of this institutions, this 
shows the great level of mobility among this legislative branch of the 
government129 
However, even with current members of the Senate and the House of Representatives the 
decisions of Colombia's political institutions are not in accordance with the preferences of 
most of the people. One example was the recent political trial to the president in the 
congress, who became innocent, even to the evidence of the issues that show the contrary, 
and also the public protest against the people involved in the 8,000 process. 
In the words of a former Colombian Political leader, Jorge E Gaitan, in 1948 before his 
assassination: 
128 Bossy or powerful person (Cacique) was a pejorative term for a traditional local or regional political leader, 
who controls the electoral outcome for a party or faction. 
129 Rodrigo Losada, "Cambia La Clase Politica," Revista, Dinero, Santa Fe de Bogota, June 1996, from Internet. 
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The political country didn't know the national country130 
With this phrase Gaitan explains that the concept of Democracy is different in each part of 
the country, with the biggest differences between the cities, regions, and.towns. It follows of 
course, that the development of the nation-state must be uniform in most aspects, but 
especially in the political aspect. Gaitan explains that in Colombia the political groups do 
not take into consideration regional necessities, problems, or conditions. The only concern 
of the people involved in politics are their personal interest. Therefore the behavior of a 
political leader and professional politician in Colombia maintains the difference between 
the political country and the national country. 
The legitimacy of the government throughout the history of Colombia has never 
been as low as it is now with the president under investigation for a connection with narco-
trafficking along with other important government members. On the other hand a good 
indicator of the consolidation is the absence of an anti-system party. But in Colombia there 
are three anti-systems movements. The guerrilla movements, narco-trafficking and sectors 
of civil society ask every day to change the government. All governments after the National 
Front have been attacked for their legitimacy, but the current government marks the lowest 
point. 
According to Larry Diamond et al.: 
... democratic legitimacy derives, when it is most stable and secure, from 
an intrinsic value commitment rooted in the political culture at all levels of 
society ...... through the maintenance of civil order, personal security, 
adjudication and arbitration of conflicts, and a minimum of predictability in 
the making and implementation of decisions. 131 
C. CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN COLOMBIA 
An indicator of consolidation proposed by Gunther, and others: 
130 Charles Bergquist, Los Trabajadores en Ia Historia Latin-American (Santa Fe de Bogota, Tercer Mundo 
Editores, 1988), p. 416. 
131 Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipzet, Politics in Developing Countries (Boulder, Colorado, 
Lynne Rienner, 1995) p. 10. 
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How can the analyst determine if a regime is consolidated? [then they 
answered]. While the passing of a severe test (alternation in power between 
former rivals, continued widespread support and stability during times of 
extreme economic hardship, successful defeat and punishment ·'of a handful 
of strategically placed rebels, or regime stability in the face of a radical 
restructuring of the party system) may constitute evidence that a regime is 
consolidated.132 
In order to develop the argument this study will present the reason for the break-
down of democracy in 1953. According to Jorge Osterling: 
General Rojas Pinilla did not want to govern, but he took power 
under the pressure of public opinion. Peace, justice, and liberty became his 
political motto, by which he meant an immediate end to any form of inter-
party violence or rural banditry. Once in power he received the immediate 
support of all sectors of society.133 
At that point the process of consolidation began with the explanation of the National Front 
and its consequences for the next four decades (1957-1996). Later in this section this study 
will use a different approach to define the concept of democracy in Colombia. 
After a period of important changes to social policies, negotiations with the liberal 
guerrillas and the implementation of gigantic public works projects, the criticism of his 
policies and himself, General Rojas was replaced by a Military Junta of five flag members-
four general officers and one Admiral on 10 May 1957. This was named the "opinion coup 
d'etat." 
The process of consolidation of democracy in Colombia begun as a result of 
agreements on the Mediterranean seacoast of Sitges and Benidorm in Spain, on 20 July 
1956. Laureano Gomez and Alberto Lleras Camargo, approved the transition to the 
National Front on December 1st, of 1957. 
132 Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros, Hans-Jurgen Puhle, The Politics of Democratic Consolidation 
(Baltimore, Maryland ,The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 12. 
133 Jorge Osterling, p. 93. 
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Another way to define the nature of this previous non-democratic regime that fits 
General Rojas Pinilla's seizure of power, was that it was driven by circumstances. In the 
words of Larry Diamond et al: 
Typically, however, military role expansion is induced by the corruption, 
stagnation, and malfunction of democratic institutions to the point at which 
the military is increasingly called upon to maintain order and comes to see 
itself as the country's only salvation.134 
An in-depth analysis of the outcome of this agreement between the elites-the 
National Front, is that it was created to solve and neutralize the parties. The parties were 
unable to lead the country and to establish peace, democracy, and institutions like the 
government, justice, and legitimacy. However the outcome itself was the first big obstacle 
to the consolidation of democracy. This is because the concept of party ideology was 
changed by the concept of populism, patronage, and sectarism. The struggle for power was 
not between parties, it was between families and partisans. The later 1960s and early 1970s 
saw an increase in discontent and an opportunity to import alien ideologies for solutions to 
Colombia problems. In a sense the first significant agreement in Colombian society did not 
solve the deep political cleavages or offer opportunities for solutions. The logical outcome 
of the agreement between the elites was the guerrilla eruption in national life. 
According to Jorge Osterling: 
The first national front administration coincided with the first years of the 
Cuban revolution, the rebirth of leftist Latin American groups, and the 
Cuban efforts to implement Che Guevara's policy of exporting the 
revolution to neighboring countries.135 
Some definitions to describe the ideal of democracy and the Colombian democracy 
were consider, but the most closest to the reality is the definition of democracy that was 
used by Juan Linz was: 
134 Diamond, et a!., p. 46. 
135 Osterling, p. 97. 
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When it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the 
use of basic freedoms of association, information, and communication, for 
the purpose of free competition between leaders to validate at regular 
intervals by nonviolent means their claim to rule, ... without excluding any 
effective political community from expressing their preference. 136 
In order to fit this concept of democracy into the Colombian reality, this study uses this 
definition to measure the conditions of democracy in Colombia. 
This analysis will confirm some of problems that do not allow the democracy to 
function properly. 
First, the free formulation of preferences. This variable appears to be partial in the 
sense that there is a limited formulation by some minorities. This is usual in most 
democratic systems, however the guerrilla and other violent groups by no means legally 
show preferences. 
Secondly, the free competition among leaders is very difficult to have with the 
violence between the competitors for a position at different level. The best example is the 
violence in the popular elections of mayors in the municipal levels. 
Political community is partial because the different actors in the political arena use 
different means to put forward their preferences. The level of participation is low in some 
areas of the country where the socio-economic conditions are minimal. 
D. MASS MEDIA EFFECTS 
The mass media in Colombia has a significant role in the political life in recent 
years. The free press has the right to criticize the different political actors. The major 
newspaper, a radio, TV, magazines belong to the great economic groups, and even some of 
them to the leaders of the political parties. The government has adopted some regulations to 
manage the news related to the public; for example Law #80 of 1993 about radio stations. 
Those laws have helped to maintain some control over the propaganda effect of guerrilla 
groups terrorist acts. 
136 Gunther, p. 6. 
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In Colombia the mass media has a great impact on everyday life. The 
communications resources have been growing. There are access to about 20 international 
TV stations, 3 national TV stations, 7 regional TV stations, 1,000 radio stations at the 
regional, and local level, and more than one hundred newspapers, magazines, at the 
national level. These mass media tools are useful as a check and balance on the political 
administrations. 
According to Maria Isabel Rueda " Now the Colombian congress is 
changing the actual law with the purpose of democratize the Colombian 
Television. However she point out that this change is not convenient 
because it can perhaps politicize more the mass media."137 
Normally information is open and available, the best example is the current 8,000 
process investigation. This is where important politicians and government officials were 
investigated. The mass media system made a historical contribution and kept the public 
informed as the issue developed. 
In summary, the mass media companies do not support the guerrilla groups or take 
an openly government position. They present the information of the political violent 
conflict in an objective way. However they are sometimes made a tool of the guerrilla 
groups in their goal of increasing support from the population. 
E. THE POSSIBILITY OF A MASS REVOLUTIONARY COALITION 
Some investigation of when it is possible for a mass revolutionary coalition to 
develop is necessary to properly address the subject of the weakness of the state. Some 
events in political history have created this phenomenon. In the case of Cuba and Nicaragua 
the result was a revolutionary mass was the Castro revolution. In the case of Colombia 
during the armed struggle and political violence there have been many opportunities for the 
guerrilla group to take advantage of the situation and call the masses to the revolution the 
most important are as follow: 
137 Maria Isabel Rueda, "Las FM," Semana, November 12, 1996, Santa fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
98 
• On April 19th, 1970, during the presidential elections, a curious incident 
occurred. On the evening of the elections day, after the polls had been closed, it 
was clear to many political analysts that opposition candidate Rojas Pinilla was 
well ahead of national front candidate, Pastrana. By 2:00 anf of20 April, he had 
received 1,235,679 votes while Pastrana 1,121, 958 votes. However at 3:00am 
an hour later, the government presented different figures of the election and two 
days later the president was Pastrana. This could fuse a revolt, but nothing 
happened. 
• The failure of the peace process negotiations between the government and the 
guerrilla groups during the Betancourt government. The end was the assault on 
the Justice Palace in the heart of the state, Bolivar square in Bogota in 1985, and 
more than 200 people died in front the Place of the Presidents. 
• The assassination of the· various presidential candidates who symbolized the 
hope and the alternative for the creation of political conditions for consolidation 
of democracy. 
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• The 8,000 process, against the fmancing of Samper's campaign, and at least 100 
important persons in the political life in Colombia, among them four ministers 
of this government, the procurator, senators, members of the house of 
representatives, the former Attorney General, and important civilians of 
different economic and social groups. The main issue was business related with 
narco-traffickers, and the use of laundered money to finance political campaigns 
and for illicit enrichment. 
All these events show the difficult stages of the consolidation of democracy of 
Colombia in the last 40 years. The political violence, the corruption among the political 
elites, the electoral fraud in the free competition for votes or support the effect of the narco-
trafficking on the society. However those events described above did not produce the 
impulse required for a mass revolution although they did create a situation of deep disorder 
and destroyed the hopes of many people that believe in Colombia. 
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The 8000 processes was the only opportunity that the guerrillas took to push a 
social revolution. We must take into consideration the loss of legitimacy of the current 
government and the support that the guerrilla groups receive from the peasant and the 
population. This was because the characteristics were unique for the 40 years of the 
democracy. Their action was an attempt to stop all the highway traffic in the country, and 
mobilized more than one million peasants. However this attempt do not have the support of 
the upper class, the media, or the most of the Colombians. 
It is clear that in Colombia, at least in the short term, there is unlikely to be a 
coalition that would create a mass revolution. 
F. THE INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES 
In the words of Timothy Wickham Crowley: 
However, one final contributor to the fall of the Batista and Somoza 
regimes was the withdrawal of international support by the United States. 138 
At this moment US-Colombian relations are at the most difficult stage in the history 
between the two nations. The cause is the problematic situation of narco-trafficking and 
illicit drugs. The best explanation of the status of Colombia was presented in the 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report ofMarch 1996: 
In 1995, Colombia remained the World's leading producer and distributor 
of cocaine and a major supplier of heroin and marihuana. The cultivation of 
illicit coca continued to increase, and in 1995 Colombia, became, despite 
eradication efforts, the world's second largest producer of coca, surpassing 
Bolivia. Colombia is home to narcotics trafficking organizations which are 
among the most powerful and ruthless criminal enterprises in the World. 139 
In addition the US government has decertified the Colombian effort against the 
production and trafficking of illicit drugs. There are also the cuts in military aid that was 
important in the counter guerrilla effort by the Armed Forces. The US government 
138 Wickham-Crowley, p. 12. 
139 U.S. Department of State, "Colombia Summary," International Narcotics Control Strategic Report, March 
1996. 
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canceled the US visa of the Colombian President Emesto Samper as a consequence of the 
famous 8,000 process for accepting money (US$6 million) from the Cali Syndicate. A 
measure by the US was the publication of a list of important persons from the high 
Colombian political leaders and Generals who it believes are involved with narcotics 
traffickers. The next possible step will be an economics sanction by US and multinational 
organizations such as the World Bank, FMI, etc. However, the most dangerous situation for 
the Colombian democracy was publicly stated by the US ambassador in Colombia, Mr. 
Myles Frechette, on a TV news program. When he was being interviewed about a probable 
coup d'etat, he said: 
Some civilian people came to my office in August 1995 to ask about the 
possibility of US support for a change of the actual president for a short 
period of time.140 
This international influence in the case of the US counter narcotic eradication 
programs shows also a new outcome. The peasant support for the guerrillas and the 
development of serious violent incidents in the south part of the country caused by the 
eradication programs and the application of a special law to control the public order. These 
incidents are linked to the legislation against narco-traffickers. This legislation will be the 
most sensitive issue in Colombia over the next few years. The US policy-makers will see 
closely the legislative agenda against narco-traffickers. The result will be the active role of 
the US influence in the current time. 
G. SUMMARY 
1. Upper and Middle Classes 
In Colombia the upper class is no longer composed of 24 families. As a modem 
third world country it has more than 1000 powerful families. These families represent the 
heads of many companies and institutions in all the of Colombian life. The middle class is 
140 "El Gran Misterio," Semana, July 10, 1996, Santa Fe de Bogota, from Internet. 
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weak but bigger smaller than 20 years ago. and, in comparison with Cuba and Nicaragua 
the middle class would be very strong. 
2. Political Parties 
Colombian political parties have tended to organize themselves around strong 
leaders, who themselves have tended to gravitate toward power base held by the two 
traditional parties, Liberal and Conservative. 
Some important· issues define the political parties in Colombia, the elite agreement 
of 1957, the history of violence, elections, bossism, patronage and factionalism in the last 
40 years. 
Both political parties have had some problems that block the participation and effect 
their credibility. These parties do not represent any ideologies because politicians have 
become individualists and only believe in being elected regardless of the parties, ideologies 
or political objectives. 
The anti-system for the political parties is the guerrilla groups and the narco-
trafficking. 
Many of the guerrilla groups were originally supported by their countries' 
communist parties, though most eventually separated themselves from the communists. The 
important point is that guerrilla movements, although usually part of the response of 
oppressed peoples to government repression, are also a result of a marginal political elite 
who have been excluded from full political power. The Colombian case show strong 
evidence in this respect. 
3. Consolidation of Democracy 
Colombia began a process of democratic consolidation in 1957 after the elite 
agreement of Sitges. But during the 40 years of this process there is evidence of a reverse 
process with the appearances of high level of political violence, political corruption, the 
increasing strength of the guerrilla groups, the protest vote, narco-trafficking, and finally the 
violence and murder during 40 years of this political violent conflict. Therefore Colombian 
democracy has been unconsolidated for many years. 
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The answer to the question why the last breakdown of democracy occurred, is 
simply the political violent conflict. This answer needs some interpretation. Guerrilla 
violence and insurgence in Colombia, since the mid-twentieth century, ·has been carried out 
by organizations that come from various origins, purposes, and social characteristics. These 
rather complex set of groups have been involved in violent political actions in attempts to 
seize power. Colombian governments and other political actors have responded to those 
challenges in an equal variety of forms. 
The political violence is the term that Colombians have adopted to describe this 
complex political and social phenomenon. 
4. The Mass Media Effects 
The mass media companies do not support the guerrilla groups or take an openly 
government position. They present the information of the political violent conflict in an 
objective way. However, they sometimes are made a tool of the guerrilla groups in their 
goal of increasing support from the population in the run for catch the news. They have also 
the willingness to present the news rather than taking position in the conflict. 
5. The Possibility of a Mass Revolutionary Coalition 
The guerrilla groups in the last 40 years have had four opportunities to call for a 
generalized uprising. But they do not have the political influence to call for a coalition that 
could challenge the Colombian state. The first opportunity was the elections of April 19th, 
1970 and the possibility of fraud against the new party ANAPO. The second was the failure 
of the peace process in 1985 and the assault on the Justice Palace in front ofthe Presidential 
Office. The third was the murders in the last ten years of more than 50 important political 
figures. These figures represented an opportunity for a better future to many people in 
Colombia. The fourth opportunity was the 8,000 process against more than 100 politicians 
and important persons for receiving money from narco-trafficking and for political 
corruption. 
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6. International Influence 
The relations among the US-Colombian governments will have a significant effect 
on the outcome of the current political crisis. At this moment US-Colombia relations are at 
the lowest ebb in the history between the two nations. The cause is the problematic situation 
of narco-trafficking of illicit drugs and the investigations about contributions of narco-
traffickers to political campaigns. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. THE FIRST VARIABLE: MILITARY BALANCE 
The first variable in Wickham-Crowley's theory concerns the relative military 
balance between the government and the guerrillas. The first point to be made is that the 
Colombian government devotes minimum resources to its armed forces for the control of 
the guerrillas. These resources are only sufficient to maintain the status quo in the conflict. 
Although the conflict is a military conflict, the government has not pursued the conflict on 
the same basis as a sovereign country would, if at war. There is no national mobilization, 
there is no suppression of government critics or the use of Martial law to defend the nation. 
With this point, it can be concluded that the Colombian Government's goal is to maintain 
the conflict at an equilibrium. 
For this variable, the guerrillas are simply too weak to achieve anything other than 
the status quo. Without the revolutionary mass, More than ten thousand guerrillas could not 
be expected to assume control of the entire country. In this case, the guerrillas are held at an 
equilibrium by the lack of support required to assume control of the country. 
The best summary of this conflict in the last five years is in the words of Daniel 
Garcia Pefia, the Peace Commissioner: 
Their economic impact today is higher than ever ... the human cost too 
has been high. Between 1990-1994, clashes cost the rebels 3,100 members 
and the army 1,800 with more than 1,350 civilian dead. If the rebels were 
merely fighting for what they claim, they might get some sympathy, their 
demands, though disparate, share common themes: Actions against poverty, 
respect for human rights, no more pursuit by paramilitary groups, plus a 
guarantee that if they lay down their arms they can engage in peaceful 
politics ..... Mr. Garcia Pefia emphasized that they have long abandoned any 
dreams of a Marxist state, politically they are reformist. 141 
141 "Colombia's Other Gangsters," The Economist, March 25, 1996, p. 48. 
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This conflict requires that all of Colombian society, government, and institutions 
help to find solutions. However the peace process must have participation in negotiations of 
the armed forces because the conflict is a real military conflict with real implications for all 
Colombian society. According to Augusto Ramirez Ocampo, a member of the National 
Commission of Conciliation: 
... the country has to know and also the guerrilla groups that the peace 
process must be negotiated in front or involving the armed forces. 142 
B. THE SECOND VARIABLE: PEASANT SUPPORT 
In this study it was pointed out that although the guerrillas have peasant support, 
this support is based on the political history of Colombia. The peasant groups that support 
the guerrillas are involved in the cultivation of cocaine and groups dispossessed in the 
collapse of the independent republics. For the traditional peasant in Colombia, the guerrilla 
groups represent a typical criminal protection racket and are not the political or social 
defender represented by the revolutions of Cuba and Nicaragua. Without these peasants, the 
guerrillas will never achieve the revolutionary mass necessary for a successful takeover of 
Colombia. 
The equilibrium, in this case, for the government is the long history of social 
problems related to the peasants in Colombia. If the government does not address these 
problems, the peasants will always be a source for the guerrillas. The dangerous trend was 
demonstrated by the eradication protest where the peasants' economic interest were 
supported by the guerrillas and the narco-traffickers and opposed by the government, 
interest driven in part by international pressure. This trend is dangerous because for the first 
time it gave the guerrillas significant support by the peasants. 
142 "La Paz no puede hacerse sin Militares," El Tiempo, Section Politica, August 28, 1996, from Internet. 
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C. THE THIRD VARIABLE: THE WEAKNESS OF THE STATE 
In Colombia the upper class was composed of 24 families in the 1950s. As a 
modem third world country Colombia has more than 1,000 powerful faln.ilies that represent 
the top entrepreneurs and politicians. With the strength of Colombia's economy in the last 
20 years (about 3-5% of economic growth) the upper class has expanded along with the 
middle class. However, the middle class remains weak but bigger than 20 years ago. 
Political power in Colombia is based on the interests of competing groups. These groups 
over time have come to agreements that make peaceful government possible. However, this 
process has not led to a consolidated democracy where all participants believe they have 
influence and power to create change. Colombia recently has begun serious reforms to bring 
about a more widely supported government. However, the state is still weak because of the 
residual effects of the very long standing agreements between the conservative and liberal 
parties in the National Front period. 
A contributing factor to the weakness of the state is the ineffectiveness of the 
judicial system. The Colombian judicial system has been under assault from both the 
guerrillas and narco-traffickers for many years. Because of this weakness, the power of the 
government has been diluted with threats and corruption by the guerrillas and narco-
traffickers. The average citizen of Colombia no longer believes that the judicial system or 
the government has the tools to protect him from the threat of the narco-guerrillas. This 
creates a dangerous system of dual power or dual authority in Colombia. 
D. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
In summary, the equilibrium between the actors in the conflict is not structural. It is 
a circumstance of the effect of the narco-trafficking on the society and the failure of the 
judicial system of the state. The dangerous trend was demonstrated by the eradication 
protest where the peasants' economic interest were supported by the guerrillas and the 
narco-traffickers and opposed by the government, interest driven in part by international 
pressure. This trend is dangerous because for the first time it gave the guerrillas significant 
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support by the peasants. If the balance of this conflict changes and actions is taken against 
the two problems, then the equilibrium will be broken. As the study shows the armed forces 
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